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ABSTRACT 
 There is a fundamental dichotomy in immigration law. On one 
hand, courts have consistently maintained that Congress has “plenary 
power” over immigration and reject most constitutional challenges on 
that basis. On the other hand, courts frequently use canons of statu-
tory construction aggressively to help interpret immigration statutes 
in favor of aliens. Immigration scholars have almost exclusively fo-
cused on the plenary power doctrine. They have either ignored the im-
portant role played by canons in immigration law or have viewed 
canons as serving only the temporary and marginally legitimate role 
of substitutes for the constitutional rights not afforded aliens. In this 
Article, I defend canons and argue that they should be viewed as hav-
ing a permanent and legitimate role in interpreting immigration pro-
visions, even in cases where no constitutional issues are raised. I ex-
plain that part of the function of some canons is to require courts to 
often adopt second-best interpretations of statutes. Contrary to the 
claims of some scholars, these second-best interpretations do not add 
unpredictability to the law. While I defend the canons that courts 
have chosen to apply in immigration cases on normative grounds, the 
Court’s recent application of the canon of constitutional avoidance 
presents new concerns. The Court has recently transformed the canon, 
which requires courts to avoid serious constitutional issues through 
statutory interpretations, into a device that often gives aliens as a 
whole greater rights, at least temporarily, than would a decision that 
rested on constitutional grounds. The expansion of the canon of con-
stitutional avoidance means that courts should be particularly careful 
when applying it to avoid unnecessarily disrupting Congress’s legisla-
tive designs. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Interest in United States immigration law is arguably at an all-
time high, with Congress and the public discussing the fate of the 
undocumented in our society and immigration scholars opining on 
academically popular topics such as the constitutional rights of 
aliens or the propriety of the government’s use of immigration provi-
sions to help fight terrorism.1 Not many, however, are discussing the 
common judicial practice of using canons of statutory construction to 
interpret important immigration statutes in favor of aliens.2 The Su-
preme Court is an enthusiastic supporter of these canons, as are 
lower courts. Indeed, at times the Court seems to go out of its way to 
assert the relevance of canons in interpreting statutes.3 Taking the 
                                                                                                                     
 1. “Alien” is a legal term under United States immigration laws, and it refers to “any 
person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2000). Al-
though the term is understandably considered by many to be pejorative, statutes, case law, 
and scholarly articles, which must be quoted in this Article, all refer extensively to “alien” and 
“alienage.” In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, the term will be used in this Article. 
 2. It is obviously not surprising that the general public does not discuss canons, but 
academics have no excuse. 
 3. See, e.g., Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.2 (2001) (stating that “it 
remains instructive that the Government acknowledges that background principles of 
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Court’s cue, this Article makes a long-overdue defense of the role of 
canons of statutory construction in immigration law. 
 A large part of immigration scholarship has been focused on the 
goal of ensuring that the government treats aliens fairly.4 One major 
barrier to this effort has been Congress’s “plenary power” over immi-
gration and the concomitant lack of constitutional protections en-
joyed by aliens. Typically, although Congress’s legislative power over 
many areas (for example, patents, interstate commerce) is described 
by courts as plenary, it is still subject to normal constitutional limita-
tions.5 In contrast, courts have traditionally considered the power of 
the federal government over immigration to be nearly unlimited and 
the constitutional rights of immigrants to be extremely limited—and 
in many cases, virtually nonexistent.6    
 In creating the plenary power doctrine in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the Court relied heavily on policy, reasoning that the United 
States’ existence as a sovereign state should give it unfettered power 
to control immigration.7 Statutory interpretation in immigration law, 
however, often employs a very different set of policy objectives. In 
contrast to the extreme deference they typically give Congress when 
considering, and usually rejecting, constitutional challenges to stat-
utes, courts frequently interpret immigration statutes against the 
government—and often do so for policy reasons. When interpreting 
statutes, courts regularly apply substantive canons of statutory con-
struction, which are policy-based directives about how statutory am-
                                                                                                                     
statutory construction and constitutional concerns must be considered in determining the 
scope of [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act’s] jurisdiction-
stripping provisions”). 
 4. As used in this Article, the term “immigration law” refers to the law governing the 
admission and expulsion of aliens rather than the more general law of aliens’ rights and 
obligations, such as their tax status and eligibility for government benefits and employ-
ment. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phan-
tom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990). 
 5. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 6. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.    
 7. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (asserting that the 
power to deport is “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent 
nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare”). See also T. Alexander Al-
einikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 862, 863 
(1989) (stating that “the Court did not start with the text or structure of the Constitution 
and ask how a power to regulate immigration might be inferred. Rather, it approached the 
question of congressional power from the perspective of the conduct of foreign affairs.”). 
This is not to suggest that the Court’s creation of the plenary power doctrine rested on 
sound principles. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND 
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 195 (1987) (arguing that the Court erroneously devel-
oped the plenary power doctrine by relying on cases that concerned only the federalism 
question of whether Congress, as opposed to states, could exclude aliens at all). 
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biguity should be resolved.8 These canons are underpinned by differ-
ent and quite varied policies supporting their application, but they 
almost always direct courts to interpret statutes in favor of aliens 
and therefore help to ensure that aliens are treated fairly by the gov-
ernment.9 Indeed, in many cases more than one applicable canon di-
rects the court to construe the statute in favor of the alien.10  
 Possibly the most controversial of these canons is the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, which requires a court to adopt a plausi-
ble—but not necessarily the most persuasive—interpretation of a 
statute in order to avoid serious constitutional issues.11 Courts have 
frequently used this canon in immigration cases, often in what can be 
described as an aggressive fashion.12 Although the avoidance canon 
has been defended by the Court on the theory that its application is 
an exercise in judicial restraint, it is targeted by critics as evidence of 
judicial activism.13 In a highly influential article written in 1990, Pro-
fessor Motomura argued that the Court has used the avoidance 
canon improperly in immigration cases by avoiding constitutional is-
sues that were not serious and engaging in questionable statutory in-
terpretations.14 In a recent immigration case, Clark v. Martinez,15 the 
Court added a new and powerful aspect to the avoidance canon by 
holding that a statutory interpretation adopted by invoking the 
canon must be uniformly applied in subsequent cases, even if the 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 818 (3d ed. 2001). Substantive canons are 
also sometimes referred to as “normative canons,” among other terms. See Curtis A. Brad-
ley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role 
of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 507 (1997). In contrast to substantive canons, “tex-
tual canons” “set forth inferences that are usually drawn from the drafter’s choice of words, 
their grammatical placement in sentences, and their relationship to other parts of the 
‘whole’ statute.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra, at 634. The Court also applies textual canons in 
immigration cases, and these canons can influence the Court’s interpretation of statutes. 
See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 343 (2005) (applying 
“the grammatical ‘rule of the last antecedent’ ”) (citation omitted). 
 9. Interpreting an immigration statute in accordance with a substantive canon usu-
ally, but not always, benefits the alien. One case where a canon did not benefit the alien 
was Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), where the Court applied the 
presumption that acts of Congress do not have extraterritorial application unless such in-
tent is clearly manifested. Applying the presumption supported the Court’s statutory hold-
ing that the Immigration and Nationality Act did not apply to actions taken by the Coast 
Guard on high seas. See id. at 173-74.  
 10. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297-300 (2001) (applying the avoidance 
canon, the presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action, and the rule 
requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction). 
 11. See infra Part I.B. (describing the avoidance canon). 
 12. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 565-75 (describing immigration cases in which the 
canon has been applied). 
 13. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court views 
application of the canon as a means of giving effect to congressional intent). 
 14. See generally Motomura, supra note 4. 
 15. 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
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subsequent cases do not raise any constitutional issues.16 The end re-
sult of this concept, the “lowest common denominator” principle, is 
that aliens as a whole are afforded greater rights, at least temporar-
ily, than they would have been granted if the statutory provision had 
been struck down on constitutional grounds.17  
 Although it is controversial and worthy of (extensive) discussion, 
focusing solely on the avoidance canon inaccurately suggests that the 
canons used in immigration cases protect only constitutional inter-
ests. To the contrary, courts often apply canons in immigration cases 
in order to promote non-constitutional interests. One notable exam-
ple is the immigration rule of lenity, which directs courts to interpret 
ambiguous statutory provisions in favor of the alien regardless of 
whether the case involves constitutional issues.18 Another canon ap-
plied without regard to constitutional issues is the presumption 
against retroactivity, which has been particularly relevant in immi-
gration law in recent years due to Congress’s penchant for enacting 
statutes with possible retroactive effects. This canon directs courts to 
give a statute only prospective effect unless its text clearly provides 
that it should have retroactive effect.19 Other canons, such as the 
canon requiring that federal statutes be construed, where reasonably 
possible, not to conflict with international law, are also applied re-
gardless of the presence of constitutional issues.20 
 Over the last couple of decades, possibly due in part to the in-
creasing importance of statutes as a source of law, there has been a 
renewed interest generally among scholars and courts in statutory 
interpretation theory and canons of statutory construction.21 Despite 
this increased interest and the liberal use of canons by courts in im-
migration cases, statutory interpretation issues have not captured 
the attention of immigration scholars in the same way as the plenary 
power doctrine.22 Perhaps the most notable exception to this disinter-
                                                                                                                     
 16. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra Part IV.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.A.1 (describing the immigration rule of lenity). 
 19. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (describing the presumption against 
retroactivity). 
 20. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of 
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 256 (1992) (stating that “the Jus-
tices are frequently debating statutory interpretation methodologies at a level of theory 
that far transcends the details of the case at hand, and that implicates the very question of 
the Court’s interpretive role in a democracy”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A More Modest 
Proposal than A Common Law for the Age of Statutes: Greater Reliance in Statutory Inter-
pretation on the Concept of Interpretative Intention, 68 ALB. L. REV. 949 (2005) (discussing 
the “statutorification” of American law). 
 22. The number of articles discussing the plenary power doctrine is staggering. The 
following are some well-known examples. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Con-
gress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1362, 1386-96 (1953); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
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est amongst immigration scholars was Professor Motomura’s influen-
tial article in which he examined the relationship between the ple-
nary power doctrine and how courts have interpreted immigration 
statutes.23 He argued that, in the past, courts applied the avoidance 
canon improperly by using two sets of inconsistent constitutional 
rules in immigration cases.24 One set of rules—usually mainstream 
constitutional rules favorable to aliens—was considered when courts 
interpreted statutes to avoid constitutional issues. When courts were 
subsequently forced to decide constitutional issues directly, however, 
they used a different set of rules, usually based on the plenary power 
doctrine, that were unfavorable to aliens. Motomura argued that the 
second set of rules revealed the first set to be “phantom constitu-
tional norms.”25 The end result in his view was that courts used the 
avoidance canon to engage in questionable statutory interpretations 
that indirectly undermined the plenary power doctrine.26  
 Motomura’s solution to the problem he described was for courts to 
abandon the plenary power doctrine and apply mainstream constitu-
tional rules in all immigration cases.27 He believed that the Court’s 
phantom norm decisions were part of a transitional phase and ar-
gued that “[a]s judges become more willing and able to address con-
stitutional issues directly, rather than through [statutory decisions], 
they should find that they do not need to grope for these awkward 
and unpredictable [statutory interpretations].”28 Thus, in Motomura’s 
view, once the transition was complete, courts would no longer have 
the same need to apply the avoidance canon or the immigration rule 
of lenity, which he viewed as a canon that was similarly designed to 
express constitutional values.29   
 This Article attempts to fill a void in immigration scholarship by 
reevaluating and defending the legitimacy and role of canons in im-
migration law. In part, this Article responds to longstanding notions 
that canons add unpredictability to the law and should serve primar-
                                                                                                                     
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. 
CT. REV. 255; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1984).  
 23. See Motomura, supra note 4. 
 24. See id. at 549 (stating that “[t]he constitutional norms that courts use when they 
directly decide constitutional issues in immigration cases are not the same constitutional 
norms that inform interpretation of immigration statutes”). 
 25. See id. at 564-75 (describing and illustrating the phantom norms theory). 
 26. See id. at 549. 
 27. See id. at 612. 
 28. Id. at 602.  
 29. See id. at 600-01. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Motomura disagreed in 
his article with the avoidance canon in general. Indeed, he stated that “[t]here is nothing 
wrong with borrowing constitutional norms to interpret statutes.” Id. at 564. He did, how-
ever, urge courts to decide constitutional issues directly rather than apply the avoidance 
canon and decide cases on statutory grounds. See id. at 612-13.  
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ily as short-term solutions to the problems presented by the plenary 
power doctrine. This Article also addresses important new issues 
that significantly affect how canons should be viewed, such as the 
weakening of the plenary power doctrine and the lowest common de-
nominator principle. While this Article defends the role of canons in 
immigration law, it should not be interpreted as implying that the 
plenary power doctrine should not be abandoned or that the constitu-
tional rights of aliens are unimportant. The elimination of the ple-
nary power doctrine would be a welcome development in immigration 
law. But the role of the plenary power doctrine has been thoroughly ex-
amined. The role of canons has not. Considering the importance of can-
ons in immigration law, it is time for this oversight to be corrected. 
 This Article has five parts. Part I describes why the role of canons 
in immigration law is a permanent one that is not tied to the exis-
tence of the plenary power doctrine. Part II explains that the prob-
lem of judicial overutilization of canons should not be confused with 
the legitimate role of canons in requiring courts to sometimes adopt 
second-best interpretations of statutes. This Part argues that these 
second-best interpretations, although sometimes rather aggressive, 
do not add unpredictability to the law. Part III explains that, due to 
the decline of the plenary power doctrine, courts now have more op-
portunities to legitimately apply the avoidance canon without relying 
on “phantom constitutional norms.”  
 Part IV explains how the new lowest common denominator princi-
ple has transformed the avoidance canon into a device that can give 
aliens as a whole greater rights, at least temporarily, than a decision 
that rests on constitutional grounds. This Part argues that while this 
new development should caution courts to carefully apply the avoid-
ance canon, its influence should not be exaggerated. In many immi-
gration cases there is a second canon, in addition to the avoidance 
canon, that would require a uniform interpretation even without the 
assistance of the lowest common denominator principle. Finally, Part 
V defends the canons that courts have chosen to apply in immigra-
tion cases. An immigration rule of severity, for example, might more 
accurately reflect congressional intent than the immigration rule of 
lenity. Nevertheless, the Court’s choice to apply the immigration rule 
of lenity, as well as other canons, rests on sound public policy, which 
courts have historically had the discretion to promote. 
II.   THE PERMANENT STATUS OF CANONS OF STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
 Canons of statutory construction are important in immigration 
law. Judicial interpretations of immigration statutes often favor 
aliens, and canons have played an important role in these interpreta-
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tions.30 Despite the fact that canons typically instruct courts to inter-
pret immigration statutes in favor of aliens, in theory the canons 
should have a somewhat limited role in the interpretation of stat-
utes. Even the strongest canon is only applicable when a statute is 
less than “clear,” however that term is defined.31 Because they recog-
nize that it is Congress that has the legislative power, courts gener-
ally purport to act as the “faithful agents” of Congress and interpret 
statutes in a way that is consistent with congressional intent.32 Thus, 
if a court believes that the meaning of a statute is clear—that Con-
gress has adequately expressed its intent—the court will interpret 
the statute accordingly.  
 In reality, canons often play a significant role in the interpreta-
tion of statutes. While courts may consider themselves bound by con-
gressional intent, identifying congressional intent regarding the 
meaning of a specific provision is not always easy or even possible.33 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Because substantive canons almost always direct courts to interpret statutes in 
favor of aliens, Karl Llewellyn’s famous critique of canons where he argued that for every 
canon pointing in one direction (“thrusts”) there is another canon pointing in the opposite 
direction (“parries”) is not relevant to immigration law, at least as regards substantive 
canons. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). 
One frequent complication to canons resolving statutory uncertainty in favor of the alien, 
however, is the Chevron doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which 
requires that courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes for 
which the agency has authority to administer. In many immigration cases courts have to 
deal with both the Chevron doctrine, which favors the government if applicable, and can-
ons, which typically favor the alien. In an earlier article, I discussed the conflict between 
the Chevron doctrine and the immigration rule of lenity. See Brian G. Slocum, The Immi-
gration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515 (2003).  
 31. The trigger for any substantive canon is something less than statutory clarity, but 
canons are not all triggered by the same level of uncertainty. Clear statement canons, for 
example, are triggered by less statutory ambiguity than are tie-breaker canons. See 
Slocum, supra note 30, at 544-46. While this distinction is valid theoretically, courts have 
not been precise about what constitutes ambiguity. See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 
91 VA. L. REV. 347, 396 (2005) (wondering “[h]ow big a gap must exist between the leading 
interpretation and the next most likely alternative for the Court to say that the statute 
permits only one construction”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative In-
terpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (noting the uncertainty in determining how 
much ambiguity is necessary before a statute is deemed to be ambiguous). 
 32. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 
(2005). I refer to intent in a broad, generic sense. All statutory interpretation philosophies 
seek in some sense, at least in part, to interpret statutes consistently with congressional 
intent. Even textualists seek to enact congressional intent, although the textualists dis-
agree with intent-based philosophies about how congressional intent should be defined and 
how statutory interpretation should seek to enact it. See id. at 422-431; Nelson, supra note 
31, at 353 (“Textualists and intentionalists alike give every indication of caring both about 
the meaning intended by the enacting legislature and about the need for readers to have 
fair notice of that meaning, as well as about some additional policy-oriented goals.”); Law-
rence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in 
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005).  
 33. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of 
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 828 (1991) (stating that “attempts to link 
2007]                          IMMIGRATION LAW 371 
 
The statutes enacted by Congress are often vague or ambiguous be-
cause Congress is unwilling and, more importantly, unable to draft 
statutes that clearly address every important issue that may arise 
regarding their application.34 Thus, it is inevitable that the judiciary 
will rely on canons of some type to help interpret statutes.35  
 Most immigration scholars have failed to appreciate the important 
role of canons in helping to resolve inherent statutory uncertainty in 
a way that is beneficial to aliens. In addition, the academy’s fascina-
tion with the plenary power doctrine has caused its view of canons to 
be distorted in two important and related ways. One distortion is the 
assumption that canons are primarily intended to compensate for the 
lack of constitutional rights enjoyed by aliens and that canons must 
therefore serve only to protect constitutional interests.36 Professor 
Motomura, for example, criticizes the immigration rule of lenity as “a 
very awkward way to express a phantom constitutional norm” and 
asserts that it is an example of “overbroad generosity.”37 The other 
distortion is the theory advanced by Motomura that if the Court were 
to end the plenary power doctrine, there would no longer be the same 
                                                                                                                     
the interpretation of statutes to the commands of an identifiable legislature are doomed”); 
Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory In-
terpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 603 (1995) (taking issue with the idea that “statutory 
meaning is necessarily created both by interpretation and by legislation”). 
 34. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 8, at 730-31 (stating that Congress deliberately 
passes vague and ambiguous statutes which delegates to courts the power to “fill in all the 
gaps” by way of a “common law” approach); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in 
the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over 
Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2002) (“There is simply too much 
law today, governing too many subjects, for legislators to address every important policy 
question that might arise under their statutes.”).  
 35. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 636, 640 (1999) (“It is hard to find anyone who believes that canons of construction 
have no legitimate place in interpretation . . . .”).  The judiciary could, of course, purport to 
follow a rule of selecting the most persuasive statutory interpretation (without regard to 
canons) in all cases. Such a rule would not be helpful, however, in situations where the 
competing interpretations are roughly equal. Moreover, there is no evidence that, as a gen-
eral matter, Congress would prefer that courts select the (usually slightly) more persuasive 
interpretation when doing so would be inconsistent with other important and long-
standing values. See infra Part V (discussing the relevance of congressional intent to the 
selection of canons).   
 36. See, e.g., DAVID A. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 9 (1987), available 
at 1987 WL 123658 (stating that the Supreme Court fashioned “a more interventionist rule 
of construction” “[a]lmost as if to compensate for this constitutional deference”). I agree 
that part of the Court’s motivation in creating and applying canons may be a desire to 
counteract the effects of the plenary power doctrine. I do contest, however, the idea that 
these canons are dependent on a lack of constitutional rights for aliens.  
 37. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 600-01 . See also id. at 573 (stating that in Fong 
Haw Tan (the case in which the Court created the immigration rule of lenity) and other 
cases “the Court allowed phantom constitutional norms to guide statutory interpretation 
by reading statutes in favor of aliens”). 
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need to apply canons such as the avoidance canon and the immigra-
tion rule of lenity.38  
 This Part argues that canons have a permanent role in immigra-
tion law that is not dependent on, or in many cases even related to, 
the existence of the plenary power doctrine. Section A illustrates how 
courts frequently apply canons in immigration cases even when no 
constitutional issues are raised. It also refutes Motomura’s argument 
that the immigration rule of lenity is a canon that is designed to vin-
dicate constitutional rights. Section B describes briefly how the 
avoidance canon has a permanent role in the interpretation of immi-
gration statutes that would likely increase, rather than decrease, if 
the plenary power doctrine were ended.  
A.   Canons that Promote Non-Constitutional Interests 
1.   The Immigration Rule of Lenity 
 One of the most significant of the immigration canons that is ap-
plied regardless of whether constitutional issues are raised is the 
immigration rule of lenity, described by the Court as “the longstand-
ing principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation 
statutes in favor of the alien.”39 Professor Motomura is correct in ob-
serving that the immigration rule of lenity is an “awkward way to 
express a phantom constitutional norm” and that it represents “over-
broad generosity,” in the sense that it applies even when the govern-
ment’s interpretation of a statute does not raise any constitutional con-
cerns.40 The problem with this observation is that the immigration rule 
of lenity should not be viewed in such a narrow fashion.  
 The immigration rule of lenity directs courts to interpret ambigu-
ous statutes in favor of aliens regardless of whether constitutional 
rights are at stake.41 Designed by the Court to protect a vulnerable 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See id. at 602 (stating that courts will “not need to grope for these awkward and 
unpredictable subconstitutional solutions”); id. at 603 (“With such changes in constitu-
tional immigration law giving judges new freedom to address constitutional claims di-
rectly, it seems less objectionable when a court breaks the [immigration rule of lenity], 
which is the least precise subconstitutional solution, by refusing to read deportation stat-
utes in favor of aliens . . . .”). 
 39. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (discussing, but not applying, 
the doctrine). The canon has not been completely ignored by immigration scholars. See, 
e.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 7, at 156 (calling the immigration rule of lenity “[t]he most im-
portant rule of statutory interpretation peculiar to immigration”).  
 40. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 600-01. 
 41. The canon has typically been described as being applicable to “deportation” provi-
sions, but it has been applied in a broader manner, including in cases involving the inter-
pretation of provisions applicable only to excludable aliens. See Slocum, supra note 30, at 
523. See also Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “the 
briefs of aliens seeking refugee status must be reviewed with lenity and any ambiguities 
must be resolved in their favor” in the same way that statutes are to be construed in favor 
of aliens).  
2007]                          IMMIGRATION LAW 373 
 
minority, the canon is thus more similar to a canon such as the one 
directing courts to interpret statutes in favor of Native Americans 
than to the avoidance canon.42 The Supreme Court explicitly created 
the immigration rule of lenity in 1948 in a case that did not raise 
constitutional concerns, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,43 on the theory 
that “because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the 
equivalent of banishment or exile,” deportation provisions should be 
strictly construed in favor of the alien.44 Courts have continued to 
apply the canon without regard to the presence of constitutional is-
sues.45 For example, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,46 the Court cited the 
canon when interpreting the “well-founded fear” standard for asy-
lum, and in INS v. Errico,47 the Court cited the canon when inter-
preting a statute that provided relief from deportation.  
2.   Other Canons 
 Other canons in addition to the immigration rule of lenity are of-
ten applied by courts to interpret statutes in favor of aliens in cases 
that do not involve any constitutional issues. Due to the frequency 
with which Congress enacts immigration legislation with possible 
retroactive effects, the presumption against retroactivity has often 
been considered by courts in immigration cases. Congressional en-
actments that operate retroactively do not violate the Constitution.48 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See Slocum, supra note 30, at 557-58; see also Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American 
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 439-40, 445-46 (2005) (de-
scribing how Chief Justice Marshall created “powerful” canons in order to protect tribes 
even though Congress had plenary power over Indian affairs as a constitutional matter). 
 43. 333 U.S. 6 (1948). 
 44. Id. at 10. In construing an ambiguous statute which provided for the deportation 
of aliens convicted of certain crimes in favor of the alien, the Court stated that “since the 
stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to 
trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible 
meanings of the words used.” Id. 
 45. See Slocum, supra note 30, at 521 n.23 (listing cases). The Court does not always 
remember the canon, however. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (explaining 
that if a statute has criminal applications, “the rule of lenity applies” to the Court’s inter-
pretation of the statute even in immigration cases “[b]ecause we must interpret the statute 
consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context”).  
 46. 480 U.S. 421,  449 (1987). 
 47. 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966). See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (citing 
“the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes 
in favor of the alien” when interpreting a provision that repealed discretionary relief from 
deportation) (citation omitted); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2429-30 
(2006) (quoting the language in St. Cyr that refers to the immigration rule of lenity in de-
scribing the alien’s argument that the canon should be applied). 
 48. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325 n.55 (“[O]ur decision today is fully consistent with a 
recognition of Congress’ power to act retrospectively. We simply assert, as we have consis-
tently done in the past, that in legislating retroactively, Congress must make its intention 
plain.”). But see Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due 
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998) (arguing that courts could strike down retroac-
tive immigration provisions as a violation of due process). 
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The presumption against retroactivity is a demanding canon to over-
come, however, and requires language that is “so clear that it could 
sustain only one interpretation” before a statute will be given retro-
active effect.49 In INS v. St. Cyr, for example, the Court held that 
provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
199650 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 199651 (IIRIRA) that repealed discretionary re-
lief from deportation did not apply retroactively because the provi-
sions lacked “a clearly expressed statement of congressional intent” 
that they be applied retroactively.52  
 Another canon particularly relevant to immigration law is the 
longstanding Charming Betsy canon, derived from the Court’s deci-
sion in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.53 The Charming Betsy 
canon requires that federal statutes be construed, where reasonably 
possible, not to conflict with international law.54 In addition, canons 
such as the presumption that Congress intends judicial review of 
administrative action and the canon requiring a clear congressional 
statement before habeas corpus jurisdiction will be barred are often 
applied in cases that raise constitutional issues.55 Theses canons are not 
limited to situations where constitutional issues are raised, however, 
and have also been applied in cases with no constitutional issues.56  
                                                                                                                     
 49. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 317. Although the statute must be “clear,” the Court in a re-
cent immigration case stated that the canon does not require that the statute contain “an 
express provision about temporal reach.” Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2430. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).  
 52. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314. See also Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2422 (consider-
ing the presumption against retroactivity to be part of its analysis of the temporal scope of 
an IIRIRA amendment to the INA enlarging the provision allowing for reinstatement of 
prior removal orders but ultimately holding that Congress was sufficiently clear in ex-
pressing its intent that the statute be applied to a reentry into the United States that oc-
curred before the effective date of IIRIRA).  
 53. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
 54. See, e.g., Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 n.28 (9th Cir. 2000) (construing statute in 
accordance with international law and stating that the court would not presume that Con-
gress intended to override international law “when the statute can reasonably be recon-
ciled with the law of nations”). See also Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over 
the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to 
Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427 (2002) (arguing that immigra-
tion law should incorporate international law). But see Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 
F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2005) (questioning whether the canon “can influence the construc-
tion and application of even ambiguous statutes”).  
 55. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-300 (citing both canons in a case that raised a 
constitutional issue). 
 56. See infra notes 201-05, 215 and accompanying text (describing a situation where 
the canon requiring a clear congressional statement before habeas jurisdiction will be 
barred was applied where no constitutional issues were raised); Reno v. Catholic Soc. 
Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63-64 (1993) (citing the presumption that Congress intends judi-
cial review of administrative action in preserving judicial review of a challenge to a legali-
zation program).  
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B.   The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the End of the 
Plenary Power Doctrine 
 As described above, the Court often applies canons in immigration 
cases without regard to whether any constitutional issues are raised. 
The avoidance canon is different in the sense that its (proper) appli-
cation is tied to the extent to which the plenary power doctrine al-
lows constitutional challenges to be considered in immigration cases. 
The canon is implicated if the government’s interpretation of a stat-
ute “would raise serious constitutional problems” and “an alternative 
interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible.’ ”57 Currently, in sev-
eral areas of immigration law, the plenary power doctrine does not 
prevent courts from considering constitutional challenges to immi-
gration provisions.58 If the plenary power doctrine foreclosed consti-
tutional challenges, however, there would be little legitimate role for 
the avoidance canon.  
 Although the legitimate use of the avoidance canon in immigra-
tion cases depends on the scope of the plenary power doctrine, the 
canon itself is a not a product of the plenary power doctrine. It is a 
canon of general application that is not specific to immigration law. 
The Court considers the validity of the canon to be beyond debate 
and believes that applying it gives effect to congressional intent be-
cause Congress would prefer the statutory interpretation that does 
not raise constitutional doubts.59 Ending the plenary power doctrine 
would therefore not render the avoidance canon unnecessary. Rather, 
it would expand, perhaps greatly, the potential for legitimate appli-
cation of the avoidance canon because there would be more constitu-
tional issues to avoid.60 Thus, as long as courts are willing to recog-
nize at least some constitutional constraints on Congress’s power 
over immigration, the avoidance canon should be viewed as a perma-
nent member of the collection of substantive canons that courts use 
to interpret immigration statutes. 
 Furthermore, those advocating for greater constitutional rights 
for aliens should support the permanent role of the avoidance canon 
rather than viewing the usefulness of the canon as being tied to the 
                                                                                                                     
 57. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 299-300.  
 58. See infra Part III (describing the current scope of the plenary power doctrine and 
outlining areas where successful constitutional challenges can be made). 
 59. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005). See also infra notes 241-49 and 
accompanying text (discussing whether the canon is consistent with congressional intent).  
 60. The avoidance canon is only applicable if a statute lacks clarity. If the constitu-
tional rules are clear, however unlikely this may be, and Congress drafts legislation with 
the rules in mind, such a potential increase in the use of the avoidance canon could be di-
minished. See infra Part V.B (describing the theory that Congress legislates in light of le-
gal constraints).  
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existence of the plenary power doctrine.61 Even if new constitutional 
rights were created, constitutional rights are systematically “under-
enforced” by the judiciary.62 This is especially true in immigration 
law.63 The avoidance canon helps offset the underenforcement of con-
stitutional rights by allowing courts to vindicate constitutional prin-
ciples through the narrowing of questionable but not necessarily in-
valid statutes.64 Thus, even if aliens enjoyed greater constitutional 
rights, the avoidance canon would still be needed in order to protect 
those rights. 
III.   CANONS PRODUCE BOTH SECOND-BEST INTERPRETATIONS AND 
PREDICTABILITY IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
 Canons have a permanent place in immigration law, but any de-
fense of canons must concede that they have not always been applied 
properly. Often the criticism is that certain canons have been under-
utilized by courts in immigration cases. Both the presumption 
against retroactivity and the Charming Betsy canon have arguably 
not been applied in cases where application was warranted.65 Other 
canons are likely similarly underutilized in immigration cases. Com-
pared to clear statement rules such as the canon requiring a clear 
congressional statement before habeas corpus jurisdiction will be 
barred, underutilization is probably particularly prevalent with re-
gard to weaker, tie-breaker canons, such as the immigration rule of 
lenity, that are only considered when a court finds a statute to be 
ambiguous at the end of its search for statutory meaning.66 In cases 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See infra notes 219-28 and accompanying text for further discussion of the desir-
ability gains for aliens coming through statutory rather than constitutional decisions. 
 62. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2113 (2005) 
(noting that courts underenforce constitutional rights for good reasons, including “courts’ 
limited factfinding capacities, their weak democratic pedigree, their limited legitimacy, 
and their likely ineffectiveness as frequent instigators of social reform”). 
 63. One theory of the plenary power doctrine is that aliens have constitutional rights, 
but courts do not enforce them. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration 
Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 377 (2004). Even if the plenary power doctrine were ended, it is 
uncertain that courts would vigorously recognize and enforce constitutional rights in im-
migration cases. See infra note 165. 
 64. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 
468-69 (1987). This function of the avoidance canon is especially powerful considering that the 
canon often requires courts to adopt second-best interpretations. See infra Part II.A. 
 65. See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, Immigration Law in the Supreme Court: The Flag-
ging Spirit of the Law, 28 J. LEGIS. 113, 134-37 (2002) (arguing that the Court has ignored 
the Charming Betsy canon in immigration cases); Vashti D. Van Wyke, Comment, Retroac-
tivity and Immigrant Crimes Since St. Cyr: Emerging Signs of Judicial Restraint, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 741 (2006) (arguing that courts have neglected to apply the presumption 
against retroactivity in cases where it has been applicable). 
 66. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 341 (2000). Some canons are undoubtedly also underutilized in the sense 
that courts may resolve statutory uncertainty in accordance with a canon applicable under 
the circumstances of the case but simply not cite the canon as authority for the interpreta-
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of underutilization, the solution is simple: courts should apply the 
canons more often. Indeed, courts should apply canons in every case 
where application is warranted.67 
 In contrast to the canons that are underutilized, the avoidance 
canon has been accused, most prominently by Professor Motomura, 
of being overutilized by courts. Motomura is correct that the canon is 
overutilized in immigration cases when courts apply it in order to 
avoid constitutional issues that are really based on phantom consti-
tutional norms and are thus not “serious.”68 In his analysis, however, 
Motomura goes a step further and argues that sometimes a statutory 
decision “can incorporate a phantom constitutional norm only by go-
ing beyond reasonable readings of a [statutory] text. Phantom-norm 
decisionmaking may help some aliens when a case evokes sympathy, 
but we cannot predict those situations.”69  
 Motomura’s analysis mistakenly conflates two separate aspects of 
the avoidance canon. The application of the canon in any given case 
raises two distinct issues. The issue of whether courts use the avoid-
ance canon to evade serious (as opposed to phantom) constitutional 
issues must be analyzed separately from the second issue of whether 
courts use the canon as a tool for producing legitimate, plausible 
statutory interpretations. The conflation of these two issues exagger-
ates the overutilization of the avoidance canon and creates a false 
impression that the canon (and likely canons in general) inherently 
creates unpredictability in immigration law.70  
 This Part explains how the application of the avoidance canon of-
ten produces second-best interpretations. These second-best interpre-
tations are part of the legitimate functioning of the avoidance canon 
and, while aggressive, cannot be viewed as examples of overutili-
zation. This Part then argues that these interpretations, and those 
produced by canons generally, do not add unpredictability to im-
migration law. 
                                                                                                                     
tion. Although such decisions may seem benign, they contribute to the perception that can-
ons are arbitrarily applied by courts. Cf. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and 
the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198-99 (1985) (stating that the 
criminal rule of lenity “survives more as a makeweight for results that seem right on other 
grounds than as a consistent policy of statutory interpretation”). 
 67. Cf. infra note 107 (explaining that whether a canon is applicable requires a judg-
ment call by the court).  Eliminating the underutilization of canons would give greater va-
lidity to the theory that canons are legitimate in part because Congress has the canons in 
mind when statutes are drafted.  See infra notes 97-105 and Part V.B (explaining the back-
ground rules theory of canons). 
 68. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (explaining the phantom norms theory).  
 69. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 601.  
 70. Undoubtedly, there are other ways in which canons are overutilized. See, e.g., in-
fra note 280. This Article, however, focuses primarily on the ones that are most relevant to 
immigration law. 
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A.   Jean v. Nelson and the Inherent Nature of Second-Best 
Interpretations 
 Professor Motomura points to the Court’s decision in Jean v. Nel-
son71 as an example of a case where the Court went beyond a reason-
able reading of the statute in order to avoid a constitutional issue 
that was in his view based on a phantom constitutional norm.72 In 
Jean, the Court avoided the issue of whether INS parole decisions al-
legedly based on race and national origin violated the Constitution 
by holding that the relevant statutes and regulations provided for 
nondiscriminatory parole consideration.73 Motomura believes that 
the Jean decision was based on a phantom constitutional norm be-
cause “the Court has never held an immigration classification uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of race or 
national origin.”74  
 While Professor Motomura’s criticism of Jean as a decision relying 
on a phantom constitutional norm may be well-deserved, his criti-
cism of Jean as a statutory interpretation decision that incorrectly 
went beyond any reasonable reading of the statute is not.75 The Court 
has recently stated that the avoidance canon’s function is to “choos[e] 
among plausible meanings of an ambiguous statute,” as opposed to a 
clear statement rule that “implies a special substantive limit on the 
application of an otherwise unambiguous mandate.”76 Nevertheless, 
applying the avoidance canon often requires a court to adopt the sec-
ond-best interpretation—one that is, in the Court’s words, “fairly 
                                                                                                                     
 71. 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
 72. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 604. 
 73. Jean, 472 U.S. at 848. 
 74. Motomura, supra note 4, at 593.   
 75. Part III.B questions whether Jean would still be a phantom norms decision if it 
were decided under the current version of the plenary power doctrine. It is not clear, how-
ever, that the decision in Jean was driven by a conclusion that the constitutional issues 
were serious. The Court did not state that its interpretations were made in order to avoid 
serious constitutional issues raised by an interpretation of the statutes and regulations 
that would allow for discriminatory parole decisions. Rather, the Court held that it would 
not consider any constitutional issues because it was obliged to resolve the case on non-
constitutional grounds if possible. Courts decide cases on constitutional grounds only as a 
“last resort” when there are no other grounds to decide the case. See Ernest A. Young, Con-
stitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. 
L. REV. 1549, 1574-75 (2000). Thus, a court that decides a case on statutory grounds in-
stead of constitutional grounds is not necessarily implying that a broad interpretation of 
the statute in question would raise serious constitutional concerns. In contrast, a court ap-
plying the avoidance canon is necessarily holding that a broad interpretation of the statute 
would raise serious constitutional issues. See id. at 1575-76.  
 76. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 141 (2005). See also Clark v. 
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (“The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play 
only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be sus-
ceptible of more than one construction.”). It has been described as a clear statement canon 
by some, however. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 8, at 599.  
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possible” but not the best interpretation.77 The canon would not be 
particularly useful if it compelled a court to adopt a statutory inter-
pretation that would avoid a serious constitutional issue only if that 
interpretation was the most persuasive one available.78 Likewise, the 
canon would not be particularly useful if a court required that the 
two competing interpretations be equally plausible—a 50-50 toss 
up—before it would apply the canon.79 In such a (relatively rare) 
case, the court could just apply a tie-breaker canon like the immigra-
tion rule of lenity.80 
 With the understanding that the avoidance canon sometimes re-
quires a court to accept a second-best interpretation, the Jean deci-
sion can be seen as an exercise in legitimate, albeit aggressive, inter-
pretation that is not dissimilar to other decisions by the Court involv-
ing the avoidance canon.81 The parole statute at issue in Jean gave 
the Attorney General discretionary authority to parole aliens into the 
country for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public bene-
fit” reasons, with no other explicit limitations.82 As stated above, the 
Court believes that the avoidance canon resolves statutory ambigu-
ity, but does not imply “limitations on otherwise unambiguous 
text.”83 Applications of the avoidance canon and the consequent adop-
tion of second-best interpretations, however, sometimes involve the 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001); see also William K. Kelley, Avoiding 
Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 840 (2001) 
(describing the Court’s long-held view that, when applying the avoidance canon, “a court 
should prefer a permissible, even if not an optimal, reading of the statute to which it can 
give effect to a pure statutory reading that it must strike down”).  
 78. Such an application would render the canon superfluous because the Court has a 
separate doctrine that requires courts to avoid deciding constitutional issues if a case can 
be decided on non-constitutional grounds. See supra note 75. See also Almendarez-Torres 
v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 270 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 79. It is the rare case when the two competing interpretations are equally plausible. 
Far more often, even in cases where courts state that a statutory provision is ambiguous, 
one interpretation is at least slightly more persuasive than the next most persuasive in-
terpretation (51 to 49, for example). Courts have not resolved the issue of how persuasive 
the second-most persuasive interpretation must be in order to label a statutory provision 
“ambiguous,” see supra note 31, but surely a statute can be considered ambiguous without 
the competing interpretations being equally plausible. 
 80. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (discussing the immigration rule of lenity). 
 81. Apart from the issue of whether the court believed that it was avoiding a serious 
constitutional issue, see supra note 75, the Jean decision was not strictly an exercise in 
statutory interpretation. INS regulations provided a list of neutral criteria for the granting 
of parole, which the Court and the INS interpreted as prohibiting the consideration of race 
and national origin in the parole decisions. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 850-51 (1985). 
The Court relied, at least in part, on the INS regulations in holding that racial discrimina-
tion was prohibited. See id. at 855. The government also argued that it did not have statu-
tory or regulatory authority to consider race or national origin, which undoubtedly made 
the interpretations much easier for the Court. 
 82. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 
 83. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 140 (2005). 
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Court creating exceptions to broad statutes or drafting language to 
insert into the statute at issue.  
 One recent example of this came in Zadvydas v. Davis,84 where 
the Court utilized the avoidance canon in interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(6), which states only that certain aliens “may be detained 
beyond the [90-day] removal period.”85 Because the government’s in-
terpretation of the statute raised a serious constitutional issue by al-
lowing the government to indefinitely detain aliens who, under im-
migration law, are considered to have entered the country,86 the 
Court invoked the avoidance canon.87 There was no explicit limitation 
in the statute regarding the length of permitted detention. Neverthe-
less, the Court, required by the avoidance canon to adopt a “fairly 
possible” interpretation of the statute which would avoid the consti-
tutional questions, “read an implicit limitation into the statute.”88 
The Court, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal 
courts,” decided that these aliens can only be detained for a six-
month period unless there is a “significant likelihood of removal in 
the reasonably foreseeable future.”89  
 As the Jean and Zadvydas decisions illustrate, the Court will cre-
ate exceptions to broad statutory language in order to avoid serious 
constitutional questions.90 These exceptions are often second-best in-
terpretations of the statutes. Indeed, the Court in Zadvydas seemed 
to recognize that its interpretation was not necessarily the most per-
suasive interpretation available.91 The Court placed its second-best 
                                                                                                                     
 84. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 85. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
 86. These aliens are distinct from aliens who are physically within the United States 
but are considered under the “entry fiction” to have been stopped at the border. See infra 
notes 175-80 and accompanying text (describing the difference between the two classes). 
 87. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.  
 88. Id. The Court did make a perfunctory pass at claiming that the statute was am-
biguous. See id. at 697 (“But while ‘may’ suggests discretion, it does not necessarily suggest 
unlimited discretion. In that respect the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”). Under such a mode of 
interpretation, the parole statute at issue in Jean, which stated that the Attorney General 
“may . . . in his discretion parole . . . only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian 
reasons or significant public benefit,” is at least as ambiguous as the statute in Zadvydas. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).  By stating the criteria that the Attorney General should con-
sider in determining whether to grant parole (humanitarian or public benefit reasons), the 
statute could reasonably be interpreted as precluding the Attorney General from denying 
parole in cases where humanitarian or public benefit reasons were present, but the Attor-
ney General instead denied parole solely for reasons that were clearly contrary to the public 
benefit, such as racial discrimination. Such an interpretation is at least as plausible as the im-
plied six-month limitation on the length of detention that the Court imposed in Zadvydas.   
 89. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 
 90. Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“A dis-
turbing number of this Court’s cases have applied the canon of constitutional doubt to 
statutes that were on their face clear.”). 
 91. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (stating that “[t]he Government argues that the statute 
means what it literally says”); Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378 (“As the Court in Zadvydas recognized, 
the statute can be construed ‘literally’ to authorize indefinite detention . . . .”). 
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interpretation in the context of other avoidance cases, however, as-
serting that it has in the past “read significant limitations into other 
immigration statutes in order to avoid their constitutional invalida-
tion.”92 The Court thus made clear that second-best statutory inter-
pretations, even aggressive ones, are part of the legitimate applica-
tion of the avoidance canon and thus should not be seen as overutili-
zation of the canon.93  
B.   The Predictability of Canons 
 The discussion above focused on the inherent nature of the avoid-
ance canon as often requiring courts to adopt second-best interpreta-
tions. Second-best interpretations are not, however, exclusive to the 
avoidance canon. Indeed, they should be viewed as being a part of 
any canon stronger than a tie-breaker canon, including clear state-
ment canons such as the canon requiring a clear congressional 
statement before habeas corpus jurisdiction will be barred.94 For ex-
ample, in the recent immigration case Demore v. Kim,95 the Court 
held that it had jurisdiction to consider Kim’s habeas corpus chal-
lenge to his detention pending his removal hearing. In the Court’s 
view, the relevant provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), did not satisfy the 
“superclear statement,  ‘magic words’ requirement for the congres-
sional expression of’ an intent to preclude habeas review.”96 Obvi-
ously, by requiring the government to meet such a difficult burden of 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. The Court cited to its decision in United States v. 
Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957), where the Court interpreted a provision of the INA allow-
ing the Attorney General to require aliens under supervision with a final order of deporta-
tion to give the Attorney General any information “as the Attorney General may deem fit 
and proper, . . . whether or not” the information was related to the supervision. Id. at 195. 
In order to avoid a serious constitutional issue, the Court limited the broad statutory lan-
guage to only allow the Attorney General authority to require information “reasonably cal-
culated to keep the Attorney General advised regarding the continued availability for de-
parture of aliens whose deportation is overdue.” Id. at 202. The Court reasoned that “[a] 
restrictive meaning for what appear to be plain [statutory] words may be indicated by . . . 
the rule of constitutional adjudication . . . that such a restrictive meaning must be given if 
a broader meaning would generate constitutional doubts.” Id. at 199. Lower courts have 
made similar interpretations. See, e.g., Shokeh v. Thompson, 369 F.3d 865, 871-72 (5th Cir. 
2004) (interpreting a statute to include a reasonableness component for the amount of 
bond to release an alien from detention); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to “include an implicit requirement that removal proceed-
ings be concluded within a reasonable time”). 
 93. As stated above, these aggressive interpretations are independent of whether the 
constitutional issue being avoided is a “phantom” one. For example, the Zadvydas decision, 
which adopted a second-best statutory interpretation, was not based on a “phantom” norm. 
See infra notes 144-54 and accompanying text. 
 94. See supra note 31 (describing how canons are not all triggered by the same level of 
uncertainty).  
 95. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 96. Id. at 517 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 327 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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proof, the Court was willing to accept a second-best interpretation of 
the statute.  
 These second-best interpretations do not necessarily make the 
statutory decisions that apply canons unpredictable. If applied cor-
rectly and consistently, well-established canons can act as back-
ground rules that guide Congress by sending signals about how stat-
utes will be interpreted.97 The Court has endorsed this theory, stat-
ing in the immigration case McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,98 
that “[i]t is presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of 
our basic rules of statutory construction.”99  
 The recent history of habeas corpus jurisdiction in immigration 
cases is a good example of the background rules theory at work. In 
1996, Congress passed AEDPA and IIRIRA, which made significant 
changes to the judicial review provisions of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA).100 The Court in INS v. St. Cyr applied the 
avoidance canon, the presumption in favor of judicial review of 
administrative action, and the “the longstanding rule requiring a 
clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdic-
tion,” thereby rejecting the government’s argument that Congress 
had clearly divested courts of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
over habeas corpus actions filed by criminal aliens to challenge 
removal orders.101  
 In response to the Court’s decision in St. Cyr, Congress passed the 
REAL ID Act of 2005.102 Lower courts have found that the new law 
eliminates habeas corpus review of final removal orders by providing 
that petitions for review in the federal courts of appeals are the ex-
clusive path into court.103 Unlike the provisions enacted in IIRIRA, 
the amendments made by the REAL ID Act bear the influence of the 
Court’s command in St. Cyr that congressional repeals of habeas 
must be worded clearly, explicitly referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “or 
                                                                                                                     
 97. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 125 (2001); Schacter, supra note 33, at 600 (arguing that this is the best theory of 
the compatability of canons with legislative supremacy). 
 98. 498 U.S. 479 (1991). 
 99. Id. at 496. It therefore followed that “given [the Court’s] well-settled presumption 
favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action,” a 
statute precluding direct review of the decisions of the INS denying applications for Special 
Agricultural Workers (SAW) status would not deprive courts of considering due process 
challenges to the manner in which SAW provisions were administered by the INS. Id. 
 100. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 
Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000). 
 101. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-99.  
 102. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). See also infra notes 
222-28 and accompanying text (discussing the REAL ID Act and judicial review). 
 103. See, e.g., Haider v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 910 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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any other habeas corpus provision.”104 Presumably Congress will be 
similarly explicit hereafter when it intends to preclude courts from 
exercising jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions.105 
 While canons can add predictability to the law when used cor-
rectly, they are only as legitimate as the courts applying them. As 
pointed out above, it is true that courts have used canons in an in-
consistent, and thus unpredictable, manner. Courts have underuti-
lized some canons and overutilized others, such as the avoidance 
canon.106 Even when canons are applied in good faith by courts, 
statutory interpretation decisions are based on the context of the 
case and therefore can be seen as unpredictable in the sense that the 
outcome, at least in close cases, cannot be known for certain before 
the case is decided.107 
 Professor Motomura argues that application of canons in immi-
gration law has been unpredictable and that courts should instead 
decide cases on constitutional grounds, but any inherent unpredict-
ability in canons should not devalue them, at least as compared to 
constitutional decisions. Constitutional decisions, even when the 
rules to be applied are clear, can be just as unpredictable as statu-
tory decisions.108 The Nguyen v. INS109 case is a good example of how 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Pub. L. No. 109-13 § 106(a)(3), 119 Stat. at 311. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigra-
tion Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 459, 465 (2006) (discussing the lack of similarly clear language in AEDPA and 
IIRIRA). Like other provisions purporting to strip courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction, the 
REAL ID Act is likely to be narrowly interpreted, however. See, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonza-
les, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting the Act as not precluding habeas 
corpus review in cases that do not involve a final order of removal). 
 105. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162, 2210 (2002) (stating that using the avoidance canon to interpret ambiguous 
statutes “usefully results in more precise legislation”). Thus, while St. Cyr may have in-
volved a second-best interpretation, Congress learned from the decision just how explicitly 
the Court requires that a statute revoking habeas corpus jurisdiction be worded. If the 
Court continues to apply canons consistently, and Congress continues to follow the guid-
ance of the Court, the need for second-best interpretations would diminish. 
 106. See infra Part III (discussing the overutilization of the avoidance canon). 
 107. The determination of when the application of a canon is warranted is a judgment 
call requiring a finding that there is statutory uncertainty. See supra notes 31-32 and ac-
companying text. Even if a court finds a statutory provision to be clear and declines to ap-
ply a canon, some may disagree and accuse the court of underutilizing the canon. The 
proper application of canons thus relies on the good faith interpretations of judges, which 
are not easily categorized as involving over- or underutilization of canons. In any case, un-
predictability in statutory interpretation cases undoubtedly derives more from judicial con-
fusion regarding when to declare that a statute is ambiguous than anything inherent in 
canons.  See supra notes 31, 78. 
 108. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The 
Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1381-82 (2006) (asserting that the 
Rehnquist Court’s “head-scratching unpredictability in many important areas of constitu-
tional law had less to do with shifting (or moderating) philosophies on the part of the Jus-
tices and more to do with its flexible, case-by-case approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion”) (footnotes omitted).  
 109. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
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abandoning the plenary power doctrine would not necessarily add 
predictability to immigration law. In Nguyen, the Court purported to 
apply mainstream, heightened scrutiny review to an immigration 
provision that explicitly discriminated on the basis of gender.110 De-
spite the weakness of the justifications for the discrimination, the 
Court upheld the provision.111 The decision is perhaps not as surpris-
ing as it would seem. In a recent article, Professor Winkler shows 
that even the Court’s application of the strict scrutiny standard de-
pends heavily on context and in some areas of law does not result in 
invalidation in a significant percentage of cases.112  
 I am not attempting to prove that statutory decisions are more 
predictable than constitutional ones. It does seem clear, however, 
that canons do not add unpredictability to statutory interpretation 
and the law in a way that is somehow novel. Rather, unpredictability 
should be seen as more of a perennial concern about law in general 
than a concern that is specific to canons.  
IV.   THE CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND THE PLENARY 
POWER DOCTRINE 
 While overutilization of the avoidance canon in immigration cases 
cannot be blamed on second-best statutory interpretations, the Court 
has overused the canon to avoid constitutional issues that later cases 
revealed were not serious, but, rather, were based on phantom con-
stitutional norms.113 The potential for courts to overutilize the avoid-
ance canon in immigration cases through phantom constitutional 
norms reasoning will, of course, always exist. Unlike second-best in-
terpretations, though, phantom norms decisions are not a necessary 
part of the application of the avoidance canon in immigration cases. 
Recent decisions by the Court reveal that the plenary power doctrine, 
while still viable, has become sufficiently weak now that the applica-
tion of the avoidance canon in several areas of immigration law need 
not involve a phantom constitutional norm. This Part first describes 
the current status of the plenary power doctrine and then outlines a 
number of important areas in immigration law where the avoidance 
canon can be, and has been, legitimately applied by courts.  
                                                                                                                     
 110. But see Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response 
to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835, 836 (2002) (arguing that “the Nguyen Court 
was implicitly taking the immigration context into account even while it expressly denied 
doing so”).  
 111. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing the decision). 
 112. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
 113. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
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A.   The Status of the Plenary Power Doctrine 
 In the first immigration cases, the Court seemed to assert that 
immigration legislation would not be subjected by courts to constitu-
tional constraints.114 Eventually, a significant exception to the ple-
nary power doctrine emerged. This exception was applicable only to 
deportable aliens, those aliens who had been deemed under immigra-
tion law to have entered the United States.115 For these aliens, courts 
limited the plenary power doctrine to substantive criteria for admis-
sion and expulsion, while applying mainstream constitutional princi-
ples to procedural matters such as deportation hearings.116  
 Notwithstanding the procedural due process exception for deport-
able aliens, and despite constant criticism from commentators, the 
plenary power doctrine remained largely untouched by the Supreme 
Court for most of the twentieth century.117 By the end of the twenti-
eth century, however, some scholars described what they viewed as a 
weakening of the plenary power doctrine. The diminishment of the 
doctrine developed through exceptions to it, such as a broadening of 
the due process exception, and also through a willingness of courts to 
subject statutes to a rational basis test instead of a complete bar to 
judicial review.118 Some scholars even predicted the eventual demise 
of the plenary power doctrine.119 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 862 (stating that early cases “denied virtually any 
authority for the judiciary to review substantive decisions as to which classes of aliens 
should be entitled to enter or remain in the country”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More 
Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
925, 926 (1995).   
 115. See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (describing the entry doctrine). 
 116. The Court in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982), described the distinc-
tion between aliens who had entered the country (and thus were entitled to a hearing that 
comported with procedural due process) and those who had not as follows: “[A]n alien seek-
ing initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional 
rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign 
prerogative. . . . [H]owever, once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to de-
velop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accord-
ingly.” Some courts have narrowed the scope of the plenary power doctrine by casting con-
stitutional challenges as procedural rather than substantive. See generally Hiroshi Moto-
mura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive 
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).   
 117. See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 865; Schuck, supra note 22, at 1 (stating that “[i]n 
a legal firmament transformed by revolutions in due process and equal protection doctrine 
and by a new conception of judicial role, immigration law remains the realm in which gov-
ernment authority is at the zenith, and individual entitlement is at the nadir”).  
 118. See Legomsky, supra note 114, at 931-37 (describing the “mild rational basis test” 
that had been developed by courts); Motomura, supra note 4, at 608 (describing how lower 
courts created a rational basis test).  
 119. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 114, at 934-37 (predicting that the plenary power 
doctrine will “wear away by attrition”); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary 
Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002) (arguing that shifts in the international context 
augur the end of the plenary power doctrine). 
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 Those predicting the end of the plenary power doctrine are cer-
tainly correct to the extent that the plenary power doctrine no longer 
forecloses, if it ever did, judicial review of immigration statutes.120 
The Court now reviews the constitutionality of governmental actions, 
although it has mostly done so under a lenient rational basis stan-
dard.121 Similarly, lower courts consistently apply the rational basis 
standard to both equal protection and substantive due process chal-
lenges.122 Courts have invalidated immigration provisions under the 
rational basis standard of review, but generally the classification in-
validated has been viewed by the court as an interpretation of a stat-
ute made by the Board of Immigration Appeals or the INS rather 
than a classification made explicit by Congress.123 
 While it is well-established, at least in the lower courts, that ra-
tional basis scrutiny can be applied to immigration statutes, it is no 
longer clear that the plenary power doctrine always precludes the 
application of a more stringent standard of review when a statute in-
fringes fundamental rights or raises equal protection concerns.124 In 
2001, the Court upheld an INA provision in Nguyen v. INS that more 
generously conferred birth citizenship on the out-of-wedlock children 
of American citizen mothers than those of American citizen fa-
thers.125 In contrast to its 1977 decision in a similar case, Fiallo v. 
Bell,126 in Nguyen the Court purported to apply the standard equal 
protection analysis for gender-based classifications. The Court explic-
itly refused to rely on the plenary power precedents in upholding the 
provision, disclaiming any need to “assess the implications of state-
                                                                                                                     
 120. This is true at least to the extent that the statutes regulate deportable aliens. In-
admissible aliens have traditionally been without constitutional protection, although some 
lower courts have questioned this doctrine. See infra note 136.  
 121. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).  
 122. See, e.g., Cordes v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the 
“ ‘disparate treatment of similarly situated aliens under the immigration laws’ implicates 
the guarantee of equal protection”) (citing Aguire v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996)); 
Rojas-Reyes v. INS, 235 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the rational basis standard 
to a substantive due process challenge). 
 123. See, e.g., Cordes, 421 F.3d at 896 (striking down the “INS’ decision” to “afford sec-
tion 212(c) relief” to some permanent resident residents but not others); Servin-Espinoza v. 
Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2002) (striking down an INS policy of allowing inadmis-
sible aliens but not deportable aliens to apply for discretionary relief from deportation); 
Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001) (striking down a BIA decision not to rec-
ognize foreign expungements for simple drug possession offenses); Garberding v. INS, 30 
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994) (striking down a BIA decision not to recognize an expungement 
of a state conviction).  
 124. Cf. Flores-Ledezma v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying the 
rational basis test because the classification did not “involve fundamental rights or a clas-
sification along suspect lines”). 
 125. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). The same constitutional challenge had been 
before the Court in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), but the case was decided on the 
basis of standing. In dicta, however, five members of the Court indicated that the provision 
was unconstitutional. See Pillard, supra note 110, at 838-39. 
 126. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).  
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ments in our earlier cases regarding the wide deference afforded to 
Congress in the exercise of its immigration and naturalization 
power.”127 In another decision from 2001, Zadvydas, the Court stated 
that the government’s exercise of its immigration power was subject 
to “important constitutional limitations” and applied the same due 
process analysis to the detention of aliens as it would to the deten-
tion of citizens.128 Together, these two cases contributed to the per-
ception, at least temporarily, that the plenary power doctrine had 
been substantially weakened, if not ended entirely. 129 
 The Zadvydas and Nguyen decisions may be evidence of the fur-
ther weakening of the plenary power doctrine, but the Court’s recent 
decision in Demore v. Kim130 establishes that the plenary power doc-
trine is still viable. In Kim, the Court held that the mandatory deten-
tion of criminal resident aliens pending their deportation hearings 
does not violate due process.131 The Court stated that detention is “a 
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process” and used the 
classic plenary power reasoning that “[i]n the exercise of its broad 
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly 
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”132 The 
Court distinguished Zadvydas, implying that Zadvydas, unlike Kim, 
was not really an immigration case and therefore not subject to the 
plenary power doctrine. The potentially indefinite detention in Zad-
vydas “did not serve its purported immigration purpose” because it 
affected aliens for whom removal was “no longer practically attain-
                                                                                                                     
 127. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 72-73; see also Pillard, supra note 110, at 845 (“At least su-
perficially, the Nguyen decision reads . . . not like a decision about immigration and natu-
ralization, but like a conventional sex discrimination case.”). One theory that would distin-
guish Nguyen from traditional immigration cases is that the plenary power doctrine is in-
applicable when the case involves a claim of citizenship at birth and thus could be said to 
involve a citizen and not an alien. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96-97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
Miller, 523 U.S. at 480-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 128. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 
510, 553 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court in Zadvydas disagreed with 
the idea that “ ‘the constitutionally protected liberty interest’ in avoiding physical confine-
ment, even for aliens already ordered removed, was conceptually different from the liberty 
interest of citizens”); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigrant De-
tention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1018 (2002) (noting that the Zadvydas Court “applied to im-
migration detention the due process principles generated in civil detention cases outside the 
immigration context, without any suggestion that a different due process analysis should ap-
ply”); supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (describing the Zadvydas decision). 
 129. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law: D. Due 
Process, 117 HARV. L. REV. 287, 297 (2003) (“When the Supreme Court decided Zadvydas 
two years ago, legal scholars celebrated the case as an important step toward the aban-
donment of the plenary power doctrine.”) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. Cf. T. Alexander Al-
einikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (stating that the case “may represent a radical shift” but con-
cluding that it is “unlikely to represent the death knell for the plenary power doctrine”).  
 130. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). 
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able” due to the aliens’ native countries’ refusal to accept their re-
turn.133 In contrast, the detention in Kim “necessarily serve[d] the 
purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to 
or during their removal proceedings.”134  
B.   The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and “Phantom” 
Constitutional Norms 
 Because the plenary power doctrine has at least some continuing 
vitality, in order to avoid the problem of “phantom” constitutional 
norms, use of the avoidance canon in immigration law must still ac-
count for the deference given the government when constitutional 
challenges are made. As discussed above, however, the plenary power 
doctrine has weakened. There is more room for legitimate use of the 
avoidance canon in immigration law than ever before. 
 Despite the continued existence of the plenary power doctrine, 
there are areas of constitutional concern where the rules applied to 
immigration provisions do not differ from those applicable to non-
immigration provisions. For example, it is well-established that 
courts will consider procedural due process challenges by deportable 
aliens.135 Some lower courts have held that even inadmissible aliens, 
those aliens deemed by the law not to have entered the country, have 
due process rights.136 Lower courts have thus properly applied the 
avoidance canon in order to avoid serious due process issues, includ-
ing ones involving the availability of judicial review.137  
 Similar to procedural due process challenges, the government 
does not seem to receive the benefit of the plenary power doctrine in 
cases involving a claim that a statute violates a structural provision 
of the Constitution, rather than an amendment to the Constitution. 
For example, in INS v. Chadha,138 the Court declared the legislative 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 527; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (suggesting that the absence of likely 
removal makes the detention less immigration-related and thus affects the extent to which 
the plenary power doctrine applies).   
 134. Kim, 538 U.S. at 528. 
 135. See supra note 116. 
 136. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(“The fact that excludable aliens are entitled to less process . . . does not mean that they 
are not at all protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.”). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We recently 
held that ‘a failure to advise a potential deportee of a right to seek Section 212(c) relief can, 
if prejudicial, be fundamentally unfair within the meaning of Section 1326(d)(3).’ ”) (quot-
ing United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004)); Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 
383 F.3d 956, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting a statute to allow for judicial review be-
cause a statute precluding judicial review “would raise serious constitutional concerns be-
cause it would potentially deprive an alien of the full and fair hearing guaranteed to him 
by the Constitution”). 
 138. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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veto unconstitutional as a violation of the Constitution’s structural 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment. The Court rea-
soned that it could review whether “Congress has chosen a consti-
tutionally permissible means of implementing [its] power” over 
immigration.139 Similarly, in St. Cyr, the Court ignored the ple-
nary power doctrine in holding that removal of habeas corpus au-
thority by Congress would raise serious constitutional issues in-
volving the Suspension Clause.140  
 Courts have also entertained challenges to “nonsubstantive” im-
migration laws without according any special deference to the gov-
ernment. For example, in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,141 the Sixth 
Circuit explained that “substantive immigration laws answer the 
questions, ‘who is allowed entry’ or ‘who can be deported’ ” in finding 
a First Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings.142 The 
distinction drawn by the Sixth Circuit between substantive and non-
substantive provisions may not be a valid one, however, after the 
Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim, which relied on the plenary power 
doctrine in upholding a nonsubstantive immigration provision.143  
 Even in areas where the government sometimes receives defer-
ence under the plenary power doctrine, application of the avoidance 
canon can be legitimate. Substantive due process challenges, at least 
to the extent they are connected to the detention of deportable 
aliens,144 are one such example. It could be argued that Zadvydas and 
Kim fit Professor Motomura’s phantom constitutional norms pat-
tern.145 First, the Court in Zadvydas identified a serious constitu-
tional issue raised by the possibility of indefinite detention of aliens 
when there is no realistic prospect of deportation. Instead of deciding 
the constitutional issue, the Court avoided it by applying the avoid-
ance canon and interpreting the relevant statute narrowly.146 Second, 
the Court in Kim subsequently declined to apply the constitutional 
norm identified in Zadvydas when it was forced to directly address 
the constitutionality of immigration detention.147 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 941. 
 140. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001). See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Cor-
pus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 562 (2002) 
(explaining that the plenary power doctrine played no explicit role in St. Cyr).   
 141. 303 F.3d 681, 686 n.6 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 142. Id. at 686-88 (claiming that “[t]he Supreme Court has always interpreted the 
Constitution meaningfully to limit non-substantive immigration laws, without granting 
the Government special deference”). 
 143. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text. 
 144. See infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between 
inadmissible and deportable aliens and why indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens is 
constitutional). 
 145. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (describing the pattern). 
 146. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
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 Such an interpretation of Zadvydas and Kim, while possible, is 
not the best interpretation of the cases. The constitutional norm 
identified in Zadvydas does not appear to be a phantom norm. Zad-
vydas was not the first case to assert that aliens have substantive 
due process rights that are implicated by detention. In Reno v. Flo-
res,148 the Court upheld regulations governing the detention of juve-
nile aliens but indicated that the plenary power doctrine would not 
protect the regulations from substantive due process review.149 
Moreover, the Court in Kim seemed to accept Zadvydas as consti-
tutional precedent and attempted to distinguish rather than ig-
nore the case.150 Lower courts have likewise treated Zadvydas as a 
constitutional holding.151  
 Similar to Zadvydas, the Kim decision should not be interpreted 
as precluding substantive due process challenges to detention. Al-
though the Court in Kim upheld the detention at issue in the case, it 
did not merely dismiss the constitutional challenge on the basis of 
the plenary power doctrine. Indeed, the Court subjected the statute 
to constitutional scrutiny, although it seemed to do so under a ra-
tional basis standard rather than a more stringent standard of re-
view.152 Lower courts have treated Kim as recognizing that aliens 
possess substantive due process rights that are implicated by deten-
tion. In Ly v. Hansen,153 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
detention of an alien for one and one-half years pending deportation 
                                                                                                                     
 148. 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
 149. Id. at 306 (citing to the plenary power doctrine but stating, “Of course, the INS 
regulation must still meet the (unexacting) standard of rationally advancing some legiti-
mate governmental purpose”). The Court held that the detention of juvenile aliens pending 
release to a parent or guardian did not violate substantive due process because juveniles 
“are always in some form of custody” and therefore have a diminished interest in absolute 
liberty. Id. at 302. Absent from the Court’s opinion was any statement that the detention 
at issue could not be reviewed. 
 150. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527-39 (2003). 
 151. See, e.g., Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that detention for ninety days under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) does not violate due process and 
that the Supreme Court in Kim “clarified that the Zadvydas due process analysis applies 
only if a danger of indefinite detention exists and there is no significant likelihood of re-
moval in the reasonably foreseeable future”); Shokeh v. Thompson, 369 F.3d 865, 871-72 
(5th Cir. 2004), vacated as moot, 375 F.3d 351 (2004) (stating that a serious constitutional 
problem would arise if indefinite detention were caused by the inability to pay a bond and 
interpreted the statute to include a reasonableness component).  
 152. Kim, 538 U.S. at 528 (“But when the Government deals with deportable aliens, 
the Due Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to ac-
complish its goal. The evidence Congress had before it certainly supports the approach it 
selected even if other, hypothetical studies might have suggested different courses of ac-
tions.”); see also Leading Cases, supra note 129, at 292 n.48 (stating that the Kim Court’s 
review of the detention provision was somewhat more searching than traditional plenary 
power review).  
 153. 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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proceedings was unreasonably long and violated the alien’s substan-
tive due process rights.154 
 Courts can also legitimately apply the avoidance canon in at least 
some cases involving equal protection claims. It is true that courts 
have generally not applied a heightened standard in cases involving 
equal protection claims, but it is now well-established that such 
claims are subject to rational basis scrutiny.155 Under rational basis 
scrutiny, provisions that discriminate on the basis of gender or race, 
for example, could be seen as irrational and struck down without ap-
plication of a heightened standard.156  
 The INS parole decisions at issue in Jean v. Nelson provide one 
possible example where discrimination based on race and national 
origin could be held to violate the Constitution under a rational basis 
standard. Recall that the Court avoided the constitutional issues in 
Jean by deciding the case on statutory grounds.157 Professor Moto-
mura argues that Jean was based on a phantom constitutional norm 
because “the Court has never held an immigration classification un-
constitutional on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of race 
or national origin.”158 It is still the case that the Court has never in-
validated an immigration classification on the basis of race, but Jean 
would not necessarily be a phantom norm decision if it were decided 
today. Courts have allowed discrimination on the basis of national 
origin,159 but the Ninth Circuit has indicated that racial discrimina-
tion in parole decisions violates the Constitution and would not sur-
vive even a low level of constitutional scrutiny.160 Thus, the Court 
could avoid the constitutional issues that would be raised by parole 
decisions based on invidious racial discrimination (as opposed to 
merely national origin discrimination) by holding that the relevant 
statutes and regulations provide for nondiscriminatory parole con-
sideration. Such a determination would not be based on a phantom 
constitutional norm.161 
                                                                                                                     
 154. Id. at 269 (stating that “Congress’s plenary control must still be exercised within 
the bounds of the Constitution”). 
 155. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 66-68 (1998). 
 157. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (discussing the decision).  
 158. Motomura, supra note 4, at 593.   
 159. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Silva v. INS, 242 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We hold that 
the equal protection principles that are implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment do not in any way restrict Congress’s power to use nationality or place of ori-
gin as criteria for the naturalization of aliens or for their admission to or exclusion or re-
moval from the United States.”). 
 160. See Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 974 n.29 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 161. In addition, Jean involved actions by the Executive Branch, rather than a classifi-
cation made by Congress, which may be relevant in deciding the case. See supra note 123 
and accompanying text.  
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 Although this Section has outlined several areas where constitu-
tional challenges can legitimately be made in immigration cases, the 
plenary power doctrine is in a state of flux, and no definitive state-
ments can be made about its future scope. Professor Legomsky’s pre-
diction that the plenary power doctrine will wear away little by little 
is perhaps being realized.162 Based on the Court’s statement in Zad-
vydas that the government’s exercise of its immigration power is sub-
ject to “important constitutional limitations,”163 lower courts may in-
creasingly be inclined to apply mainstream constitutional rules in 
immigration cases.164 Even if the plenary power doctrine is not fur-
ther weakened, however, there are several major areas in immigra-
tion law where application of the avoidance canon is legitimate and 
appropriate and does not require the use of phantom constitutional 
norms.165 
V.   A NEW CONCERN: THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR 
PRINCIPLE 
 The Court’s use of the avoidance canon was notable in the past 
because the canon was sometimes applied to avoid constitutional is-
sues that were not serious, but the Court’s recent use of the canon is 
notable for another reason. The Court’s decision in Clark v. Marti-
nez166 has added a new and powerful aspect to the avoidance canon 
by directing that a statutory interpretation made by invoking the 
canon be uniformly applied in subsequent cases even when the later 
cases do not raise any serious constitutional issues.167 The Court’s 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See Legomsky, supra note 114, at 934. 
 163. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). 
 164. The Court’s decision in Kim, which reinforced the plenary power doctrine, would 
be an obvious barrier to such holdings, even though it did not disavow any of the state-
ments in Zadvydas. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (explaining the deci-
sion in Kim). 
 165. On the other hand, even if the plenary power doctrine were ended, as many immi-
gration scholars desire, it is not clear how many more constitutional challenges to immi-
gration statutes would be successful. For example, it seems unlikely that the Court would 
ever view Congress’s power to regulate immigration as suspect and effectively mandate 
open borders or hold that aliens have a fundamental right to remain in the United States 
once they have entered, even if they have family members in the country. See Kif 
Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
701, 706 (2005). Another critically important doctrine of immigration law that would be 
unaffected by an end to the plenary power doctrine is the longstanding principle that de-
portation is not punishment, which denies important protections that criminal defendants 
receive, such as a right to government appointed counsel and a jury trial and prohibitions 
on ex post facto laws and cruel and unusual punishment. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deporta-
tion, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad 
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000). Thus, while constitutional decisions may result in 
permanent rights for aliens, the scope of the rights gained from such decisions will proba-
bly always be relatively limited. 
 166. 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
 167. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
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creation of what it terms the “lowest common denominator” principle 
is new in the sense that courts in the past have often interpreted the 
same statutory language in different ways depending on the status of 
the litigant before the court.168  
 Although the lowest common denominator principle is related to 
the phantom constitutional norms problem, the two issues should not 
be confused.169 The lowest common denominator principle is not spe-
cific to immigration law. In the Court’s view, it is a legitimate and 
necessary consequence of the invocation of the avoidance canon and 
is therefore applicable even when the issue avoided is genuine.170 In-
deed, the Court’s purpose in creating the lowest common denomina-
tor principle likely was not an effort to protect aliens. Professor 
Siegel has theorized that the lowest common denominator principle 
was adopted by the author of the Martinez decision, Justice Scalia, in 
an attempt to limit the judicial discretion that would be inherent 
were judges permitted to choose different interpretations for the 
same statutory language.171 Thus, unlike the phantom constitutional 
norms problem, the issues raised by the creation of the lowest com-
mon denominator principle are particularly relevant to immigration 
law, but also extend beyond it. 
 This Part illustrates how the lowest common denominator princi-
ple can create greater rights for aliens as a whole, at least temporar-
ily, than a decision that rests on constitutional grounds. This Part 
also argues that the power of the lowest common denominator prin-
ciple warrants caution by courts when they apply the avoidance 
canon. Courts must be particularly diligent in ensuring that the con-
stitutional issues are serious and the interpretation adopted is plau-
sible, even if second-best.  
                                                                                                                     
 168. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statu-
tory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339 (2005). 
 169. See supra Part III (discussing the problem of phantom constitutional norms). In 
his article, Professor Motomura did argue that using canons to protect constitutional inter-
ests could cause overbreadth in the sense that the statutory protections could be broader 
than the protections offered by constitutional decisions. He was referring to the immigra-
tion rule of lenity, not the lowest common denominator principle, however. See Motomura, 
supra note 4, at 601. As described in Part I.A, the immigration rule of lenity is not an ex-
ample of overbreadth, because the canon is designed to be applied in cases of ambiguity 
without regard to whether constitutional issues are raised.   
 170. Because the Court considers the lowest common denominator principle to be part 
of the legitimate application of the avoidance canon, the issue is technically not one of overutili-
zation, unlike a phantom norms decision where the avoidance canon is applied despite the trig-
ger for application of the canon (serious constitutional issues) not having been met.  
 171. See Siegel, supra note 168, at 370-77. 
394  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:363 
 
A.   Statutory Decisions that Give Aliens More Rights than 
Constitutional Decisions 
1.   Zadvydas v. Davis and Clark v. Martinez 
 The creation of the lowest common denominator principle in im-
migration law started with the Court’s decision in Zadvydas.172 Re-
call that in Zadvydas, the Court applied the avoidance canon in in-
terpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which states that certain aliens 
“may be detained beyond the [90-day] removal period.”173 The Court, 
required by the canon to adopt a “fairly possible” interpretation of 
the statute that would avoid the constitutional questions raised by 
the detention of aliens who legally are considered to have entered the 
country, held that these aliens can only be detained for a six-month 
period unless there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the rea-
sonably foreseeable future.”174 Thus, as a result of the Court’s use of 
the avoidance canon, the holding was one of statutory construction 
that was driven by constitutional concerns.  
 What is remarkable about the decision and its aftermath is that 
the statutory decision in Zadvydas likely resulted in greater rights 
for aliens as a whole, at least temporarily, than if the decision had 
rested on constitutional grounds. Prior to 1996, there were two 
classes of aliens, “excludables” and “deportables.” As the Court stated 
in Zadvydas, the difference between the two classes “rested upon a 
basic territorial distinction.”175 Excludable aliens, even ones who 
were physically present due to having been “paroled” into the country 
by the Attorney General, were considered under the “entry fiction” to 
be outside the United States and ineligible for admission or entry.176 
Deportable aliens, in contrast, were those who had “entered” the 
country, legally or otherwise.177 Excludable aliens were considered to 
have little or no constitutional rights, while aliens who had entered 
the United States had greater constitutional rights.178  
                                                                                                                     
 172. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 173. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
 174. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 701. 
 175. Id. at 694. 
 176. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994) (repealed 1996). Like the plenary power doctrine, the 
“entry fiction” has long been harshly criticized, see, e.g., Hart, supra note 22, at 1389-96, 
but still retains constitutional significance.  
 177. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994) (repealed 1996); see Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 
961 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991). The importance of having entered the United States led to signifi-
cant, and often bizarre, litigation regarding whether an alien could be deemed to have 
made an entry. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (determining whether a 
return from a visit of a couple of hours in Mexico was an entry); In re Ching, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 203, 206 (BIA 1984) (determining whether aliens who had escaped from custody at 
LAX and captured two days later in Texas had entered).  
 178. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (describing the different constitutional 
rights afforded the two groups of aliens). 
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 On September 30, 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, which changed 
the terminology.179 There are still separate grounds of “inadmissibil-
ity” and “deportability,” but the difference between the two grounds 
now turns on whether an alien has been legally “admitted” to the 
United States rather than whether the alien has gained “entry,” legal 
or otherwise.180 While there are still statutory differences between 
inadmissible and deportable aliens, many of the provisions in the 
INA, including § 1231(a)(6), now apply without differentiation to 
both classes. 
 In contrast to a statute providing for the indefinite detention of 
deportable aliens, which the Court in Zadvydas indicated would at 
the least raise serious constitutional questions, a similar statute pro-
viding for the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens would likely 
have been constitutional at the time of the decision.181 In Shaugh-
nessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,182 which was explicitly not revis-
ited by the Court in Zadvydas, the Court held that the indefinite de-
tention of a returning permanent resident alien did not violate due 
process because the alien was “treated as if stopped at the border” 
and thus had no due process rights at all.183 Furthermore, lower 
courts have consistently held that provisions providing for the in-
definite detention of inadmissible aliens are constitutional.184  
 If the Court in Zadvydas had interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) as 
giving the Attorney General the authority to detain aliens indefi-
nitely, but that the indefinite detention of deportable aliens was un-
constitutional, the provision likely would have been left partially in-
tact. Facial challenges are disfavored by the Court, especially when 
the statute at issue can be applied constitutionally in some circum-
                                                                                                                     
 179. In IIRIRA, Congress substituted the term “inadmissible” for “excludable” wher-
ever the latter term appeared in the INA. IIRIRA § 308(d)(3)(A). Congress also replaced 
the separate exclusion and deportation proceedings with a single “removal” proceeding. 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a. 
 180. See Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 394 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, unlike the 
old regime, some aliens who have entered the country are grouped, in the “inadmissible” 
category, with aliens who have not entered the country. There continues to be significant 
statutory as well as constitutional distinctions between aliens who have gained “admis-
sion” or “entry” to the United States and those who have not. See Aleinikoff, supra note 
129, at 375 (noting that the Court’s opinion in Zadvydas reaffirms “the border/interior dis-
tinction as a constitutional matter”).  
 181. In this Article, I use the terms “inadmissible” and “excludable” interchangeably. 
In using the term inadmissible, I intend for it to be understood as synonymous with ex-
cludable, even if doing so is somewhat inaccurate, see supra note 179, and to only include 
those aliens who are deemed under immigration law to have been stopped at the border. 
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 375 n.2 (2005) (treating the terms inadmissible and 
excludable as being equivalent).  
 182. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 183. Id. at 215. 
 184. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.   
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stances and has a severability clause.185 Thus, the Court likely would 
have struck down the statute as applied, leaving the government with 
the ability to apply the statute to the detention of inadmissible aliens.  
 The Court did not rule that § 1231(a)(6) is unconstitutional; 
rather, it interpreted the statute as not giving the Attorney General 
the authority to detain deportable aliens indefinitely.186 In Clark v. 
Martinez,187 the Court extended the Zadvydas statutory holding to 
include inadmissible aliens. The Court held that § 1231(a)(6) should 
be interpreted as imposing the same limitations on the detention of 
inadmissible aliens as the Court in Zadvydas found were applicable 
to the detention of deportable aliens.188 The Court recognized that its 
interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas was driven by the avoid-
ance canon. It rejected the notion, however, that it needed to deter-
mine whether indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens would raise 
serious constitutional questions before it interpreted § 1231(a)(6) as 
similarly not authorizing the indefinite detention of inadmissible 
aliens.189 Instead, the Court stated: 
It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a 
limiting construction called for by one of the statute’s applications, 
even though other of the statute’s applications, standing alone, 
would not support the same limitation. The lowest common de-
nominator, as it were, must govern, . . . whether or not those con-
stitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the 
Court.190 
 The end result of the Zadvydas decision has thus been very broad. 
Before IIRIRA replaced the previous statutory regime with § 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
873, 878-93 (2005). The Court has recognized that immigration provisions are to be severed 
when possible. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983) (quoting language from the 
INA that “[i]f any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person 
or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provi-
sion to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby”). 
 186. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 187. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).  
 188. See id. at 377-78. In dissent, Justice Thomas interpreted Zadvydas differently, ar-
guing that “Zadvydas established a single and unchanging, if implausible, meaning of § 
1231(a)(6): that the detention period authorized by § 1231(a)(6) depends not only on the 
circumstances surrounding a removal, but also on the type of alien ordered removed.” Id. 
at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 189. See id. at 380-81. Significantly, the Court in Martinez did not claim that its inter-
pretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas was the most persuasive interpretation 
available, only that the interpretation in Zadvydas must be applied uniformly to cases in-
volving inadmissible aliens. See supra Part II.A (describing how the avoidance canon some-
times requires courts to adopt second-best interpretations).  
 190. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 380-81. See also Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“The government has offered no authority suggesting that a litigant may not take advan-
tage of a statutory interpretation that was guided by the principle of constitutional avoid-
ance when that litigant’s case does not present the constitutional problem that prompted 
the statutory interpretation.”).  
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1231(a)(6), courts almost uniformly held that the Attorney General 
had both statutory and constitutional authority to detain inadmissi-
ble aliens indefinitely.191 After the passage of IIRIRA, courts held the 
same.192 Even after the Zadvydas decision, some courts held that the 
Attorney General retained both statutory and constitutional author-
ity to detain inadmissible aliens indefinitely.193 Due to the Court’s 
use of the avoidance canon in Zadvydas and the lowest common de-
nominator principle in Martinez, the Attorney General was precluded 
from detaining indefinitely not only deportable aliens, whose indefi-
nite detention raises serious constitutional problems, but also inad-
missible aliens, whose indefinite detention does not currently raise 
serious constitutional problems. As a result, the Attorney General no 
longer had authority to detain even inadmissible aliens who had 
been ordered removed well before 1996 and been subject to govern-
ment detention procedures for more than twenty years.194  
2.   INS v. St. Cyr and Its Aftermath 
 The potential for the avoidance canon to give aliens greater rights 
than a decision striking down the statutory provision in question as 
unconstitutional is not, of course, limited to detention cases. The 
formula is simple: A court interprets a statutory provision in favor of 
one group of aliens through an application of the avoidance canon. 
The court then, pursuant to the lowest common denominator princi-
ple, uniformly applies the same interpretation in cases involving a 
second group of aliens even when the alternative (and often more 
persuasive) interpretation favoring the government would not have 
raised any serious constitutional questions.195  
                                                                                                                     
 191. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding 
that the “overall structure” of the INA provisions relating to excludable aliens assumed 
that the Attorney General had authority to detain excludable aliens indefinitely); Gisbert 
v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the indefinite de-
tention of excludable aliens did not violate their substantive or procedural due process 
rights). One major exception was the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 
238 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2001), in which the court held that the indefinite detention of ex-
cludable aliens violated their due process rights. 
 192. See, e.g., Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 193. See, e.g., Sierra v. Romaine, 347 F.3d 559 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Zadvydas’s 
temporal limitation on detention does not apply to inadmissible aliens); Borrero v. Aljets, 
325 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding “that Zadvydas’s six-month presumption of 
reasonableness is inapplicable to inadmissible aliens”). The Ninth Circuit, however, held 
that, after Zadvydas, the government no longer had statutory authority to indefinitely de-
tain inadmissible aliens. See Xi, 298 F.3d at 837-39.  
 194. One of the aliens in Martinez arrived on the Mariel boatlift from Cuba in 1980 and 
was ordered removed in 1994. 543 U.S. at 374-75. See also Benitez v. Wallis, 402 F.3d 1133 
(11th Cir. 2005) (ordering the release of a Cuban national who came to the United States on the 
Mariel boatlift in 1980); Arango Marquez v. INS, 346 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).  
 195. Of course, if the case involving the second group of aliens reaches court first, the 
court would apply the lowest common denominator based on constitutional concerns in-
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 A similar phenomenon can also be found in St. Cyr and its after-
math.196 Recall that in St. Cyr the Court held that AEDPA and 
IIRIRA did not divest district courts of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 over habeas corpus actions filed by criminal aliens to 
challenge their removal orders.197 In holding that habeas corpus re-
view was still available for criminal aliens, the Court relied on the 
avoidance canon, because an interpretation of the statutes “that 
would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court 
would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.”198 The Court 
did not rely only on the avoidance canon, however. The Court also 
cited the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of adminis-
trative action” and “the longstanding rule requiring a clear state-
ment of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”199 Signifi-
cantly, the Court noted that “Congress could, without raising any 
constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through the 
courts of appeals.”200 Thus, even if the Court had held that the review 
provisions in AEDPA and IIRIRA unconstitutionally deprived criminal 
aliens of the ability to file habeas corpus petitions, the provisions would 
have been constitutional as applied to noncriminal aliens, who can ob-
tain review of final orders of removal in the courts of appeals.201 
 Subsequent to St. Cyr, and without benefit of the Court’s decision 
in Martinez, some lower courts held that the Court’s decision in St. 
Cyr compelled a finding that noncriminal aliens could challenge their 
removal orders through habeas corpus in district court even though 
they, unlike criminal aliens, were able to obtain judicial review 
through the review provisions set forth in the INA. The Third Circuit 
in Chmakov v. Blackman202 made such a holding, explicitly refusing 
to adopt different interpretations of the same statutory provisions 
depending on the status of the alien.203 Similarly, the Second Circuit 
in Liu v. INS204 agreed with the Third Circuit that habeas jurisdic-
tion was not repealed for non-criminal aliens, reasoning that “St. Cyr 
                                                                                                                     
volving the first group of aliens. See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 724. Either way, the second 
group of aliens receives rights that it would not receive under a constitutional holding.  
 196. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 197. Id. at 299. I use the term “criminal aliens” to refer to aliens who are alleged by the 
government to be deportable on the basis of their criminal activities. “Noncriminal” aliens 
are those who are alleged to be deportable on other than criminal grounds.  
 198. Id. at 300; see also Neuman, supra note 100, at 1991 (describing the difficulties of 
resolving the Suspension Clause issue). 
 199. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298. 
 200. See id. at 314 n.38. See also id. at 314 (noting that “[i]f it were clear that the ques-
tion of law could be answered in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept 
the INS’ reading” of the statute).  
 201. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2000). 
 202. 266 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 203. Id. at 215. 
 204. 293 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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held as a matter of statutory construction that ‘habeas jurisdiction 
under § 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA.’ The 
Court’s construction of those statutes, which does not distinguish, 
expressly or implicitly, between criminal and noncriminal aliens, 
compels our conclusion.”205  
B.   The Significance of the Lowest Common Denominator Principle in 
Immigration Law 
 The decisions described above illustrate how second-best interpre-
tations made through the avoidance canon can lead to greater rights 
for aliens as a whole, at least temporarily, than would a decision 
striking down the statute as unconstitutional on an as-applied basis. 
Because of the lowest common denominator principle, the avoidance 
canon has been transformed into an even more powerful tool for pro-
tecting aliens.206 Indeed, the effects of the lowest common denomina-
tor principle are particularly strong in immigration law because of 
immigration law’s unique classifications. It is still true that inadmis-
sible and deportable aliens have very different constitutional 
rights.207 Yet many immigration provisions, such as the one at is-
sue in Zadvydas, are general in scope and apply to both deportable 
and inadmissible aliens. In addition, immigration law makes other 
distinctions among aliens, such as the criminal/noncriminal dis-
tinction in St. Cyr.208 There are thus numerous potential opportu-
nities for aliens, as a whole, to benefit from the lowest common 
denominator principle.209  
                                                                                                                     
 205. Id. at 40 (citations omitted); see also Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(agreeing with the Second and Third Circuits that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed for 
noncriminal aliens). Not all circuit courts agreed that the habeas route was still available 
to noncriminal aliens, however. See, e.g., Lee v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that habeas jurisdiction was not available when another avenue of review was 
available). In his dissenting opinion in Martinez, Justice Thomas, pointing to the Chma-
kov, Riley, and Liu decisions, stated that “[t]he logic in allowing noncriminal aliens, who 
have a right to judicial review of removal decisions, to take advantage of constitutional 
doubt that arises from precluding any avenue of judicial review for criminal aliens . . . es-
capes me.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 401 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 206. It appears that lower courts have treated the lowest common denominator princi-
ple seriously. See, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2006) (in-
terpreting a different set of detention provisions than the one at issue in Zadvydas to 
allow detention for only a limited time, even though the alien before the court had 
been stopped at the border, because deportable aliens were also subject to detention 
under the same provisions). 
 207. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text. 
 209. I state that aliens, as a whole, are benefited, but to be more specific, the group 
likely to be assisted the most by the lowest common denominator principle are inadmissi-
ble aliens. In many cases where a court avoids a constitutional claim brought by a deport-
able alien, it is still likely that the constitutional challenge would not have been a serious 
one if it had been made by an inadmissible alien. Yet, under the lowest common denomina-
tor principle, the statutory provision must be interpreted uniformly.  
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 Despite the undeniable power of the lowest common denominator 
principle in immigration law, its significance in immigration cases 
should not be overstated. Professor Siegel argues that the lowest 
common denominator principle, when combined with the avoidance 
canon, “rachets up the judicial interference with congressional will.”210 
This is true, however, only when there is no canon other than the avoid-
ance canon that is relevant to the interpretation of the statute.  
 Multiple canons are often implicated in immigration cases, and in 
circumstances where a second canon is applicable in addition to the 
avoidance canon, the statutory provisions should often be interpreted 
uniformly without regard to the lowest common denominator princi-
ple. In cases that raise serious constitutional questions, the avoid-
ance canon is implicated if the statutory interpretation favoring the 
alien is a fairly possible interpretation, while the immigration rule of 
lenity, for example, is implicated whenever an immigration statute is 
ambiguous.211 Thus, if an immigration provision is ambiguous and 
the government’s interpretation of it would raise a serious constitu-
tional question, both canons direct courts to interpret the statute in 
favor of the alien, with the immigration rule of lenity being applica-
ble regardless of any constitutional concerns. The presumption in fa-
vor of judicial review of administrative action, the canon requiring a 
clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction, 
and the Charming Betsy canon can also be applicable in cases that 
raise serious constitutional issues.212 
 In Zadvydas, it is perhaps the case that only the avoidance canon 
was relevant, although the Court did state that the statutory provi-
sion in question, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), was ambiguous.213 It is possi-
ble, however, that the statutory provision was sufficiently unclear 
that the avoidance canon could be applied but not so ambiguous that 
the immigration rule of lenity, a tie-breaker canon, would have been 
applied to the provision absent any constitutional concerns.214 In such 
a scenario, application of the lowest common denominator principle 
in Martinez could be viewed as truly aggressive.  
                                                                                                                     
 210. See Siegel, supra note 168, at 382; see also Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 207 F. Supp. 2d 
326, 334 (D.N.J. 2002) (arguing that the idea that a Supreme Court interpretation avoid-
ing serious constitutional questions applies to every conceivable application of the statute 
would dramatically expand the power of the courts at the expense of Congress). 
 211. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (describing the immigration rule of 
lenity).  
 212. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text (describing these canons). The pre-
sumption against retroactivity is another canon frequently used in immigration cases, al-
though it is not often relevant in cases where constitutional issues are raised. See supra note 48 
and accompanying text (explaining that retroactive statutes are not unconstitutional). 
 213. See supra note 88. 
 214. See supra note 31 (comparing the degree of ambiguity required to trigger the 
avoidance canon and the immigration rule of lenity). 
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 The St. Cyr decision presents a clearer situation where more than 
one canon was applicable. In St. Cyr, the Court applied the avoidance 
canon and interpreted the relevant provisions as not depriving courts 
of habeas corpus jurisdiction with regard to petitions filed by crimi-
nal aliens.215 Subsequent to St. Cyr, some lower courts interpreted 
the same provisions as not depriving courts of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion with regard to noncriminal aliens, even though such an interpre-
tation would have been constitutional.216 Yet in St. Cyr, unlike per-
haps Zadvydas, another canon was relevant. The Court in St. Cyr 
also cited the canon requiring a clear statement of congressional in-
tent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.217 Thus, after St. Cyr, lower courts 
correctly recognized that even though the avoidance canon was not 
applicable, another canon was applicable and, independent of the 
lowest common denominator principle, required that the provisions 
be interpreted in favor of noncriminal aliens.218   
 Another reason why the significance of the lowest common de-
nominator should not be overstated is that even when canons are 
used in an aggressive and unpredictable manner, judicial decisions 
applying canons are not as dangerous to congressional supremacy, at 
least in some respects, as judicial decisions that rest on constitu-
tional grounds.219 When a court ignores congressional intent and ag-
gressively interprets a statute in favor of an alien by applying the 
avoidance canon, and thus does not act as a “faithful agent” of Con-
gress, it can still be said to act with restraint by not deciding the case 
on constitutional grounds. Congress can overturn a court decision by 
amending a statute, but it cannot overturn a constitutional decision 
without amending the Constitution.220 Consequently, many immigra-
                                                                                                                     
 215. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text. 
 217. In addition, the Court cited the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of 
administrative action.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001). 
 218. See Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that, although 
there was no Suspension Clause problem because noncriminal aliens had another avenue 
of judicial review, the Court’s decision in St. Cyr also rested on the basis that there must 
be a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction). Because of the 
applicability of a second canon, Justice Thomas was incorrect in his dissent in Martinez 
when he criticized lower courts for holding that habeas corpus jurisdiction still existed for 
noncriminal aliens subsequent to the Court’s decision in St. Cyr. Clark v. Martinez, 543 
U.S. 371, 401 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 219. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 341 (2000) 
(noting that canons do not create serious risks to the operation of the regulatory state be-
cause they only ensure congressional deliberation on issues of great sensitivity). 
 220. When the Court applies the avoidance canon, however, Congress can interpret the 
decision as one that creates constitutional rights and may be wary of attempting to over-
turn it. Lower courts may also interpret the decision as making a constitutional holding, 
even when doing so is not warranted. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 611. 
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tion commentators believe this judicial restraint comes at a price.221 
Because statutory decisions, as compared to constitutional decisions, 
can be much more readily fixed by Congress, they do not result in 
permanent rights for aliens.  
 The recent legislation targeting judicial review and the resulting 
litigation illustrates both the limited nature of statutory decisions as 
protective devices for aliens and how statutory decisions can operate 
as a dialectic between the courts and Congress.222 In 1996, Congress 
passed IIRIRA and AEDPA, which purported to make significant 
changes to the judicial review provisions of the INA, almost all of 
which were hostile to aliens.223 Courts generally interpreted these 
provisions very narrowly, including the Court in St. Cyr when it 
saved habeas corpus jurisdiction for criminal aliens.224 In response to 
these decisions, Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005, generally 
eliminating habeas corpus jurisdiction to review final orders of re-
moval.225 Significantly, however, Congress removed many of the bars 
to judicial review in the federal courts of appeals that caused crimi-
nal aliens to file habeas corpus petitions in district courts in order to 
challenge their removal orders.226 The end result is that judicial re-
view has largely been saved for criminal aliens, which was certainly 
an open question after IIRIRA was passed in 1996.227 Thus, while the 
statutory decisions by courts did not result in permanent rights for 
aliens, the decisions led to a dialogue between the courts and Con-
gress that ultimately resulted in both preserved rights for aliens and 
more precise legislation.228  
 Although the effects of the lowest common denominator principle 
should not be overstated, it is important that the avoidance canon be 
applied carefully in immigration cases. Justice Thomas complains 
that under the “lowest common denominator principle, a statute like 
§ 1231(a)(6) must be narrowed once and for all based on constitu-
                                                                                                                     
 221. See, e.g., Jose Javier Rodriguez, Recent Development, Clark v. Martinez: Limited 
Statutory Construction Required by Constitutional Avoidance Offers Fragile Protection for In-
admissible Immigrants from Indefinite Detention, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 518-19 (2005).  
 222. Earlier in this Article I used the REAL ID Act of 2005 to illustrate the way in 
which canons can add predictability to the law by acting as background rules that guide Con-
gress when it chooses statutory language. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.  
 223. See generally Neuman, supra note 100. 
 224. See supra notes 198-98 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Ishak v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing how the “Real ID 
Act amended section 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, to place review of all final removal 
orders, for both criminal and non-criminal aliens, in the courts of appeals”). 
 226. See Motomura, supra note 104, at 487. 
 227. See id. at 463. 
 228. See Elhauge, supra note 105, at 2210; Sunstein, supra note 219, at 331 (arguing 
that the presumption against retroactivity, along with other canons such as the avoidance 
canon, act as nondelegation canons that require sensitive issues (both constitutional and 
non-constitutional) to be deliberately and expressly addressed by Congress).    
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tional concerns that may never materialize.”229 It should not seem 
surprising to Justice Thomas that constitutional issues that are 
avoided may end up being decided in favor of the government. Ag-
gressive (but plausible) statutory interpretations are part of the le-
gitimate application of the avoidance canon, and the nature of the 
canon is such that the constitutional issues are avoided, not de-
cided.230 Nevertheless, because of the lowest common denominator 
principle, an implausible statutory interpretation, as opposed to a 
plausible second-best interpretation, seems even more aggressive if 
the constitutional issue is not one that would have been decided in 
favor of the alien. 
 Another common complaint about the avoidance canon is that 
when a court chooses to avoid a constitutional question, it frequently 
also avoids the obligation of careful consideration and reason-giving 
that typically accompanies constitutional adjudication.231 This criti-
cism is particularly relevant to immigration law. Considering their 
history of using phantom constitutional norms when applying the 
avoidance canon, courts must be particularly careful in immigration 
cases to ensure that the constitutional issues to be avoided are in-
deed both real and serious.232 Especially in light of the lowest common 
denominator principle, decisions that are too aggressive risk unneces-
sarily disrupting Congress’s legislative designs rather than respecting 
Congress, which is one of the purposes of the avoidance canon.233  
VI.   THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
CHOSEN BY THE SUPREME COURT 
 Thus far, this Article has accepted the Court’s choices about which 
canons to create and apply and has dealt with various issues regard-
ing the over- or underutilization of the canons it has chosen. It is 
widely accepted that the application of some type of canons is inevi-
                                                                                                                     
 229. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 397 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Of course, a 
statute cannot be “narrowed once and for all” by a court because Congress can always 
override the statutory decision. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (describing 
the REAL ID Act). 
 230. See supra Part II.A (explaining that a legitimate aspect of the avoidance canon is 
the adoption of second-best statutory interpretations).  
 231. See Young, supra note 75, at 1574. The Court itself acknowledged in Martinez 
that it does not engage in a full constitutional analysis when it applies the avoidance 
canon. See 543 U.S at 381. 
 232. Another common complaint about the avoidance canon is that it creates a “pe-
numbra” effect which “actually broadens the impact of constitutional provisions beyond 
their legitimate warrant.” Young, supra note 75, at 1574. Similar to the phantom norms 
danger, if courts are careful when describing the constitutional issues that they are avoid-
ing, and careful to avoid only serious constitutional issues, the penumbra effect should be 
limited, even though the statutory interpretation may be a second-best interpretation.  
 233. See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s view that 
application of the avoidance canon gives effect to congressional intent). 
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table because statutes are frequently ambiguous due to Congress be-
ing either unable or unwilling to legislate with clarity.234 Choosing 
which canons to create and apply, however, is a more difficult issue. 
For example, in cases of statutory ambiguity courts have sometimes 
applied the immigration rule of lenity, which directs courts to inter-
pret ambiguities in immigration statutes in favor of aliens.235 But 
why should courts resolve statutory ambiguity in this manner? Why 
should a court not instead apply an immigration rule of severity and 
interpret any ambiguities against aliens? 
 Although as self-styled “faithful agents” of Congress courts often 
justify their statutory interpretations on the basis of congressional 
intent, many of the canons currently applied in immigration cases 
are hard to defend on that basis. In fact, as this Part illustrates, 
some of the canons arguably run counter to congressional intent. 
Nevertheless, this reality does not make the canons chosen by courts 
illegitimate. It cannot be doubted that all of the substantive canons 
to some degree reflect value choices made by judges.236 The goal of 
statutory interpretation may be aimed primarily at enforcing the in-
tent of Congress, but an exclusive focus on congressional intent tends 
to obscure the fact that judicial discretion is inherent in statutory in-
terpretation. Many judges, while still striving to uphold congres-
sional intent, also desire to promote other values.237 The values cho-
sen by the Court to protect in immigration cases are worthy ones, es-
pecially compared to the values that would be promoted by alterna-
tive canons. This Part thus defends the immigration canons that 
courts have chosen despite the likelihood that they do not always re-
flect congressional intent.  
A.   The Relevance of Congressional Intent 
 When a statute is unclear, courts must decide whether the uncer-
tainty is an invitation to make policy choices, through the application 
of canons or otherwise, or, conversely, whether they must attempt to 
adopt canons that will reflect probable congressional intent.238 The 
                                                                                                                     
 234. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (describing the immigration rule of 
lenity).  
 236. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (1992) 
(“[S]ubstantive canons are not policy neutral. They represent value choices by the Court.”); 
Solan, supra note 32, at 477 (arguing that the avoidance canon does not “substitute for in-
tent” but rather “interact[s] with intent”). 
 237. See generally Steven J. Cleveland, Judicial Discretion and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 31 (2004); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the 
Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2005) (stating that “whatever one’s school of 
thought . . . judicial judgment will always creep into the equation in some form”). 
 238. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 394 (stating that “[u]nless interpreters are willing to 
hold . . . statutes void for vagueness, they need some way to finish the job and to pick from 
2007]                          IMMIGRATION LAW 405 
 
choice between policy and congressional intent may be a distinction 
without much of a difference, though. As faithful agents, courts often 
justify the use of a canon on the basis that its application accurately 
reflects congressional intent.239 Resolving the issue of which canons 
can be said to reflect congressional intent, however, is not easy, or 
perhaps even possible.240 
1.   The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and Congressional 
Intent 
 Consider the avoidance canon.241 In Martinez, Justice Scalia as-
serted that the canon is “a means of giving effect to congressional in-
tent, not of subverting it.”242 The theory, resting on what Justice 
Scalia terms a “reasonable presumption,” is that Congress intends to 
legislate constitutionally and would thus prefer a statutory interpre-
tation that does not raise constitutional doubts.243 Accordingly, when 
a statute can reasonably be interpreted in two distinct ways, one of 
which raises a potential constitutional issue, the less problematic 
reading should prevail.  
 Not everyone agrees, however, that application of the avoidance 
canon, as a general matter, renders a result faithful to congressional 
intent. Some have argued that the canon is hard to defend in terms 
of capturing Congress’s likely intent because “there is no particular 
reason to presume that members of Congress systematically try to 
avoid gray areas and to refrain from pushing their power to its lim-
its.”244 The detention provision at issue in Zadvydas is a good exam-
                                                                                                                     
among the possible meanings that their primary interpretive tools have identified”). The 
choice for courts posed in the text assumes that the statutory ambiguity is not a delegation 
to agencies to make the policy choices, as envisioned in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See generally Slocum, supra note 30 (de-
scribing how the immigration rule of lenity interacts with the Chevron doctrine). 
 239. See Solan, supra note 32, at 430 (“[C]ourts frequently justify many of the canons 
of construction upon which textualists rely as good proxies for the intent of the legis-
lature.”). But see Nelson, supra note 31, at 386 (“[Textualists] hesitate to argue that 
the best test of a canon is whether its use will minimize the gap between what inter-
preters understand statutes to mean and what members of the enacting legislature in-
tended them to mean.”).  
 240. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 518 (stating that any attempt to ground canons in 
legislative intent encounters substantial conceptual and empirical difficulties).  
 241. See supra Part I.B (describing the avoidance canon). 
 242. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005). 
 243. See id. at 381; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (“Congress . . . 
legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”); Note, Should the Supreme Court Pre-
sume that Congress Acts Constitutionally? The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Re-
liance on Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1798, 1801 (2003) (noting that “[u]nder this rationale, the canon is a means of ferret-
ing out congressional intent”).   
 244. Nelson, supra note 31, at 387. See Elhauge, supra note 105, at 2210 n.117 (stating 
that the canon cannot “generally be justified as reflecting likely legislative preferences”). 
Many have argued that the canon is illegitimate. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Lib-
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ple of a statute where it can be said that Congress did not intend to 
avoid a gray area and wanted to push its power to its constitutional 
limits.245 Professor Aleinikoff points out that Congress had no reason 
to know before Zadvydas that its detention authority was restrained 
by the Constitution.246 In addition, the detention provision at issue 
was enacted as part of a statute, IIRIRA, that was the “toughest im-
migration legislation adopted in half a century.”247 If an interpreta-
tion of the statute giving the government power to detain even de-
portable (as opposed to only inadmissible) aliens indefinitely was the 
interpretation most likely consistent with congressional intent, it 
could be concluded that the application of the canon was unwar-
ranted.248 The subsequent extension of the Zadvydas interpretation 
in Martinez to cases involving inadmissible aliens, who likely can 
constitutionally be indefinitely detained, could be said to only com-
pound the mistake.249  
2.   The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Congressional Intent 
 Similar to the avoidance canon, it is questionable whether the 
immigration rule of lenity reflects congressional intent.250 A possible 
theory that the canon reflects likely congressional intent is that de-
portation is a severe measure and fair notice, reasonable reliance, 
and settled expectations (values that Congress would presumably 
endorse when the consequences of deportation are so great) dictate 
that ambiguities in immigration statutes be interpreted against the 
                                                                                                                     
erals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1405-
06, 1409 (2002) (calling the avoidance canon “wholly illegitimate” and “a misuse of ju-
dicial power”); Kelley, supra note 77, at 871 (calling for the abandonment of the avoid-
ance canon).   
 245. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Zadvydas decision). 
 246. See Aleinikoff, supra note 129, at 368 (arguing that there was “nothing to suggest 
that Congress would not have wanted persons deemed by the Attorney General to be dan-
gerous to be held for as long as he or she thought appropriate”). But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 
533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (stating that the Court had “reason to believe . . . that Congress 
previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months”).  
 247. Aleinikoff, supra note 129, at 368. 
 248. The Court itself did not argue that it was adopting the most persuasive interpre-
tation of the statute. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, despite 
the arguments of some scholars that the avoidance canon does not reflect congressional in-
tent, it is possible that Congress favors plausible statutory interpretations that avoid con-
stitutional issues it was not aware of when the statute at issue was enacted.  If this is true, it 
could be argued that Congress would prefer the result in Zadvydas even if it had originally in-
tended to give the Executive Branch authority to indefinitely detain deportable aliens. 
 249. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s decision in 
Martinez). 
 250. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 678 (1999) (stating that the criminal rule of lenity is not 
invoked in order to reflect the “legislative preferences”). 
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government, not the alien.251 Throughout much of the history of im-
migration law, however, it would be hard to argue that Congress in-
tended that ambiguities in immigration statutes be construed in fa-
vor of aliens. The federal government’s early restrictions on immigra-
tion were motivated by racial animus, and it was not until halfway 
through the twentieth century that racial restrictions were elimi-
nated from the INA.252 Recent immigration legislation, while perhaps 
not driven by racial animus to the same extent, has been remarkably 
harsh.253 It could certainly be argued that it is doubtful that the same 
Congress that enacts immigration laws that severely disadvantage 
aliens would intend that any ambiguities in these statutes be inter-
preted in favor of aliens. 
 The reasoning that courts use when applying the immigration 
rule of lenity also indicates that these courts have not necessarily in-
voked the canon in order to help enact congressional intent. Indeed, 
concern for the political vulnerability of aliens likely motivated the 
Court in creating and applying the immigration rule of lenity more 
than a desire to help enact probable congressional intent.254 When 
the Court created the canon, it stated that it was interpreting the 
relevant statute narrowly “because deportation is a drastic measure 
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile,” not because do-
ing so would help enact congressional intent. 255 The Court’s concern 
for the vulnerability of aliens is evident in other areas of the law. 
While the Court has consistently upheld immigration statutes from 
constitutional attack, on many occasions the Supreme Court has 
called aliens a “discrete and insular minority” in striking down re-
strictions on aliens outside of immigration law.256  
                                                                                                                     
 251. These are values that are vindicated by the void for vagueness doctrine, which the 
Court has applied to deportation provisions. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123-24 
(1967). 
 252. See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform 
After “9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 317-22 (2003); see also Kevin R. Johnson, 
Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the 
Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525 (arguing that immigration 
law disproportionately affects persons of color). 
 253. See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation 
Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000). 
 254. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1007, 1032-33 (1989) (explaining that the immigration rule of lenity is an effort to 
protect certain “discrete and insular minorities” or “Carolene groups”).  
 255. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). The Court has consistently recog-
nized that deportation is a serious penalty that inflicts great hardship. See, e.g., INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (stating that “[d]eportation is always a harsh 
measure”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (“Though deportation is not techni-
cally a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of 
the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty—
at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”).  
 256. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.5 (1984) (striking down a state 
statute that barred a resident alien from becoming a notary public and stating that 
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3.   The Presumption Against Retroactivity and Congressional 
Intent 
 Other canons are similarly difficult to defend on the basis that 
Congress would want them to be applied to immigration statutes. 
The presumption against retroactivity may be premised on the idea 
that members of Congress rarely intend to establish new substantive 
rules for past conduct.257 The Court has stated that “[b]ecause it ac-
cords with widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily oper-
ate, a presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide with 
legislative and public expectations.”258  
 Whether the application of the presumption against retroactivity 
does in fact reflect congressional intent in immigration cases is ques-
tionable. First, it certainly cannot be said that Congress is at all re-
luctant to enact immigration laws with retroactive effect.259 Second, 
like the immigration rule of lenity, the Court’s statements suggest 
that its goal in applying the presumption against retroactivity is 
fairness rather than an attempt to help enact congressional intent. 
In St. Cyr,260 for example, the Court noted that concerns about retro-
active laws become more acute when they target an “unpopular 
group[]” and stated that “because noncitizens cannot vote, they are 
particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation.”261 In fact, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
“[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority . . . for whom . . . 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate”) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 372 (1971)). See also LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Given the 
extent to which resident aliens are legally entrenched in American society, their inability 
to participate in the political process qualifies them as a ‘prime example of a discrete and insu-
lar minority for whom [] heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.’ ”) (citation omitted). 
 257. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 390.  
 258. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 261, 272 (1994). See also Ronald M. 
Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative 
Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 349 (2003) (noting that the Court’s motivation for the presumption 
against retroactivity is the unfairness involved in retroactive legislation and concern for 
the rule of law). 
 259. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (holding that retroactive ap-
plication of new grounds for deportation provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952 did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Rankine v. 
Reno, 319 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (provision repealing discretionary waivers of deportation 
did not have impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who had been convicted at trial for 
aggravated felonies prior to such repeal). See also Nelson, supra note 31, at 390-91 (stating 
that courts sometimes will apply the presumption against retroactivity even under circum-
stances in which Congress has not traditionally shied away form retroactive effects or in 
which the particular Congress that enacted a statute was willing to accept those effects).   
 260. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).   
 261. Id. at 315 & n.39 (citing Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress 
and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1626 (2000)). See 
also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (stating that “responsivity to political pressures poses a risk 
that [Congress] may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution 
against unpopular groups or individuals”); Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Struc-
tural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 
1293 (2002) (noting that these passages in St. Cyr tie the immigration rule of lenity to the 
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noted and rejected the government’s skepticism that aliens are an 
unpopular group.262  
B.   Canons as Background Rules Guiding Congress 
 As the above discussion illustrates, it is difficult to establish that 
any given canon reflects Congress’s subjective intent, to the extent 
that such a subjective intent even exists.263 Nevertheless, it is possi-
ble to argue that the canons applied in immigration cases still reflect 
congressional intent, albeit in a different sense. Several scholars, as 
well as Justice Scalia, have argued that certain canons capture con-
gressional intent because Congress presumably has them in mind 
when it drafts a statute.264 This concept is evidenced by the REAL 
ID Act.  The Act specifically responded to the Court’s decision in 
St. Cyr, which applied canons of construction in holding that Con-
gress did not clearly repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction for criminal 
aliens, by explicitly referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “or any other ha-
beas corpus provision.”265  
 Even if it cannot be assumed that Congress would want a canon 
such as the immigration rule of lenity, for example, to be applied to 
any given immigration statute, the immigration rule of lenity is an 
established canon that has been around for decades.266 Congress, at 
least to some degree, is capable of precluding the use of canons.267 
                                                                                                                     
theory expressed in the Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938), that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” may “call for a cor-
respondingly more searching judicial inquiry”); Elhauge, supra note 105, at 2210 (interpreting 
St. Cyr as a judicial attempt to elevate the influence of a politically weak group).  
 262. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315 n.39.  
 263. See Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the 
Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1211 (1990) (noting that “[t]he 
fundamental fiction, one so broad as to escape being primarily legal at all, may be called 
the fiction of collective intent”). 
 264. Justice Scalia has stated that once rules of “strict construction . . . have been long 
indulged, they acquire a sort of prescriptive validity, since the legislature presumably has 
them in mind when it chooses its language.” Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contem-
porary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 583 (1990). Many others have also ar-
gued in favor of the background rules theory. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 32, at 436 n.57 
(arguing that canons have value not because they capture the legislature’s subjective in-
tent, but because they represent a subset of the mutually available background conven-
tions that make communication possible); Molot, supra note 34, at 1319 (stating that 
there is value in having clear canons available to legislators when they draft statutes); 
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 140 (2000) (“It is more 
important that judges select one answer and apply it consistently over time than that 
they select the right answer.”). 
 265. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
 266. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (questioning the legitimacy of substantive 
canons but stating that the criminal rule of lenity is “validated by sheer antiquity”). 
 267. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002). 
410  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:363 
 
Thus, it can be argued that if the canon is well-established at the 
time a statute is enacted, its application by courts to the statute is le-
gitimate without regard to whether the canon is an accurate measure of 
how members of Congress themselves understood the statute.268  
C.   The Value of Canons to Promote Important Public Values in 
Immigration Law 
 While attempts have been made, such as the background rules 
theory described above, to defend canons on the basis that they re-
flect congressional intent, one cannot doubt that all of the substan-
tive canons applied in immigration cases are, at least to some degree, 
underpinned by values.269 Indeed, the discussion in Section A does 
not establish that the canons used in immigration cases reflect con-
gressional intent, but it does illustrate that courts desire to promote 
other values. A presumption in favor of retroactivity, for example, 
might be a more accurate measure of congressional intent in immi-
gration cases than a presumption against retroactivity.270 Such a pre-
sumption, though, would run counter to the Court’s desire, exhibited 
in St. Cyr, to protect a vulnerable minority group from unfair legisla-
tion when doing so would not explicitly run counter to congressional 
intent.271 Similar reasons undoubtedly motivate the Court’s choice of 
other canons, such as the decision to apply the immigration rule of 
lenity instead of an immigration rule of severity.272 
 The Court’s decision to select canons such as the presumption 
against retroactivity and the immigration rule of lenity, instead of a 
presumption in favor of retroactivity and an immigration rule of se-
verity, can thus be defended on the theory that courts should pro-
mote important public values through the creation and application of 
canons. One of these values, according to Professor Sunstein, is that 
“[i]n the face of ambiguity, courts should resolve interpretive doubts 
                                                                                                                     
 268. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 386. Presumably, if the canons are clear and are 
consistently applied, they will ultimately help minimize the gap between the courts’ inter-
pretations of statutes and the meanings intended by members of Congress. See id. 
Whether Congress is likely to consider canons when drafting most statutes is unclear, 
however.  See generally Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative 
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 602 (2002). The Real ID Act 
responded to a specific Supreme Court decision, but it is uncertain whether future legisla-
tion that does not respond to specific decisions will reflect the same careful consideration of 
the impact of canons on interpretation. 
 269. See supra note 236. 
 270. See supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text. 
 271. See id. 
 272. Certainly, the Court has motivations for its selection of canons other than a desire 
to protect aliens. The Court purports to apply the avoidance canon, for example, because it 
believes doing so reflects congressional intent. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying 
text. The Court’s aggressive use of the canon in the past in order to protect aliens, how-
ever, reveals that is also sees the canon as accomplishing much more than merely showing 
respect for Congress. 
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in favor of disadvantaged groups.”273 Undoubtedly, while this theory 
finds support in at least some of the Court’s decisions, selecting can-
ons on the basis of whether they favor disadvantaged groups would 
not appeal to all of the Justices, and the Court’s selection of canons 
does not have to rest on that basis. For example, Justice Scalia’s 
support for the idea that well-established canons are legitimate be-
cause Congress has them in mind when it drafts a statute is con-
nected to the theory that the judiciary should promote values associ-
ated with stability in the law, which is usually achieved by interpret-
ing statutes narrowly. Professor Shapiro, for example, has argued 
that the courts’ application of canons such as the presumption against 
retroactivity and the criminal rule of lenity helps to promote values 
such as predictability and continuity in statutory interpretation.274  
 Even dynamic statutory interpretation theories that seek to inter-
pret statutes in light of their present societal, political, and legal con-
text (as opposed to that prevailing at the time of a statute’s enact-
ment) can be used in support of the canons that the Court has chosen 
to apply in immigration cases.275 Professor Elhauge, for example, has 
suggested that ambiguous statutes be resolved by default rules that 
favor political satisfaction at the time the judicial decision is made, 
but if the court is unable to determine legislative preferences, it 
should adopt a construction aimed at spurring the legislature to take 
up and resolve the otherwise indeterminate statutory question.276 In 
Professor Elhauge’s view, the avoidance canon, the immigration rule 
of lenity, and the presumption against retroactivity can all be de-
fended on this basis.277 
                                                                                                                     
 273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 483-84 (1989) (pointing to the canon that ambiguities in statutes should be in-
terpreted in favor of Indian tribes as an example); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, 
Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1256-58 (1990) (arguing that interpretive regimes 
should rest on “principles”). Other scholars have also advocated that courts should promote 
public values through the application of canons. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 254, at 
1032-34 (discussing how courts can interpret statutes to protect traditional “Carolene 
groups”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical 
Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 768 (1992).  
 274. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 943-44, 960 (1992) (suggesting that the canons used by the Supreme 
Court reflect a preference for continuity). See also Tyler, supra note 237, at 1419, 1426 (ar-
guing that canons such as the presumption against retroactivity help advance predictabil-
ity and continuity in statutory interpretation, values which should be promoted rather 
than current democratic preferences or prevailing social norms); Nelson, supra note 31, at 
391 (noting that textualists argue that canons can encourage predictability in the law).  
 275. See e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1479 (1987) (contending that statutes should “be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is, in 
light of their present societal, political, and legal context”).  
 276. See Elhauge, supra note 105; Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory De-
fault Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002).  
 277. See Elhauge, supra note 105, at 2210, 2270-72. 
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 Regardless of the theory used to defend the canons chosen by the 
Court, the careful application of canons by courts in immigration 
cases is part of the legitimate, appropriate, and historical use of can-
ons by courts generally.278 All of the canons discussed in this Article 
serve important functions in helping judges resolve statutory uncer-
tainty in a way that promotes sound public policy and protects vul-
nerable aliens. The benefits of abandoning the guidance of well-
established canons such as the immigration rule of lenity or the pre-
sumption against retroactivity on the ground that they are not useful 
in interpreting statutes are dubious, while the benefits of retaining 
such canons are numerous.279 Moreover, changing canons would un-
dermine, at least temporarily, the value and stability of canons as 
background rules guiding Congress and would create difficult issues 
such as whether the new canons should be applied retroactively to 
statutes passed before their creation.280 
 The canons currently applied in immigration cases are not, of 
course, universally celebrated by scholars and courts. Some canons, 
particularly the avoidance canon, have been subjected to harsh criti-
cism and calls for their abolishment.281 Nevertheless, the beauty of 
any particular canon is a matter of taste. Whether one sees the can-
ons currently applied in immigration cases as legitimate devices for 
courts to use when interpreting statutes, or as illegitimate usurpa-
tions of policymaking authority by courts, is a function of one’s juris-
prudential philosophy. One crucial point that cannot be debated, 
though, is that the Court approves of the use of the canons de-
scribed in this Article and shows no signs of abandoning their use 
any time soon.  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Substantive canons of statutory interpretation occupy an impor-
tant place in the law. In immigration cases, they are especially sig-
nificant because they usually direct courts to interpret statutes in fa-
vor of aliens and have the potential, through the application of the 
                                                                                                                     
 278. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Ju-
dicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1021-25, 
1103 (2001) (showing that an early understanding of judicial power in the United States 
included an approval of canons of statutory construction). 
 279. Cf. Nelson, supra note 31, at 391 (stating that “[t]he errors caused by refusing the 
guidance of specific canons might well outnumber the errors generated by the oversimplifi-
cations that such canons inevitably make”).    
 280. Cf. Robert W. Scheef, Temporal Dynamics in Statutory Interpretation: Courts, 
Congress, and the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 529, 544 (2003) 
(arguing that the Court’s use of the avoidance canon improperly fails to take into account 
the temporal dynamic involved when the constitutional rule that raises the problem was 
established after the enactment of the statute in question). 
 281. See supra note 244.  
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avoidance canon, of giving aliens as a whole greater rights, even if 
sometimes only temporarily, than would a decision based on consti-
tutional grounds. Despite their importance, the role of canons in im-
migration law has largely been either ignored or impugned by the 
academy. Unfortunately, the role of canons will never receive the at-
tention lavished on the plenary power doctrine because statutory de-
cisions do not result in permanent rights for aliens. In addition, can-
ons will always be the subject of criticism because they do not always 
reflect congressional intent and are both over- and underutilized by 
courts. Yet, considering the relative lack of constitutional rights af-
forded aliens, canons are especially important devices in protecting 
this vulnerable part of the population. When used properly, the ap-
plication of canons in immigration cases adds predictability to the 
law and helps to promote important public values, a phenomenon 
sorely lacking elsewhere in immigration law. 
